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SUMMARY
Discrete brand choice is a microeconomics problem that is concerned with demand
predictions, pricing, and how personal choice behaviors affect the supply-demand
equation. It is an important problem addressed by many, including McFadden and
Heckman, who won the Nobel Prize in 2000 for their work on this topic. The discrete
brand choice problem involves“selection among alternative sets in markets to maxi-
mize a customer’s own self-interest defined by a utility function under the consumer
consumption level constraint.” The role of models, including those of the operations
research variety, in advancing the state of the art of this problem domain has been
postulated. However, very few discrete brand choice models encountered in the liter-
ature study the choice dynamics from the market share perspective. There is clearly
a need for more precise integration of more information and robust estimation tech-
niques.
In this thesis, we study the brand choice problem from the following three per-
spectives: a company’s market share management, introduction of customers with
different perspectives, and an analysis of an application domain that is illustrative of
these issues. Our contributions following these perspectives include (1) the develop-
ment of a stochastic differential-jump game (SDJG) model for brand competition in a
specific situation wherein market share is modeled by a jump-diffusion process, (2) a
robust hierarchical logit/probit model for market heterogeneity, and (3) applications
of a logit/probit model to the dynamic pricing problem occurring in production-
inventory systems with jump events.
xiv
First, we develop an SDJG model for brand competition. An SDJG model has
the ability to model continuous variables and jump/discrete events simultaneously.
Jump events are modeled by mark-time Poisson processes, with advertising effort
as the control input. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is the modeling
framework proposed for this problem, but we resort to a Markov chain approximation
method as the favored computational strategy because of the difficulty of obtaining
a closed-form solution for a general HJB. The SDJG model is explicitly defined and
applied in market competition. To our knowledge, this is the first application of this
type in the literature.
Next, we consider a Bayesian robust hierarchical logit/probit model in the analy-
sis of market heterogeneity. A hierarchical model combines features of products with
characteristics of customers. Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation is used
for the estimation component. A robust hierarchical logit/probit model is then devel-
oped and validated using credit card data from a regional bank system. Our model
represents an improvement over a general hierarchical logit/probit model based on
better prediction precision and higher log margin density (LMD).
Finally, we employ a logit/probit model by imbedding it in a dynamic pricing
problem. The resultant dynamic pricing model integrates information of production,
inventory, and customers’ choice. We not only consider more complex demand pro-
cesses modeled by the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) process, but also production systems
with jump events. The dynamic pricing problem considered here is a more complex
and comprehensive situation than those found in current literature.
Our research explores the use of a quantitative method of operations research to
xv
control the dynamics of market share and provides a precise estimation method to
integrate more detailed information in discrete brand choice models.
Keywords: Discrete Brand Choice, Stochastic Differential-Jump Game,





1.1 Research Problem Statement
Brand choice is the foundational topic of central interest in this dissertation. It is the
subject of various constituencies, including organizations represented by companies,
firms, etc., and their customers. It is instructive to consider the perspective of these
groups with respect to the concept of brand choice.
For a customer, brand choice is deciding which type of products, services, and
plans to select from some alternative sets in a market so as to maximize his/her own
self-interest, which is defined by John Hicks and Paul Samuelson (Samuelson 1970)
as stable and innate preferences. This self-interest can be represented as a utility
function U(x), where x is the consumer consumption level. A customer wishes to
maximize the utility function subject to constraints such as budget or availability.
The problem of brand choice is of central interest to both customers and researchers.
An array of models with varying degrees of sophistication, has been proposed in the
literature for studying the problem of brand choice. Although the well-known logit
and probit models (McFadden 1974, 2001) may be simple, a customer’s decision is
actually quite complex because of many factors such as culture, demographics, eco-
nomics, physiology, etc. Marketing researchers endeavor to understand, describe, and
predict consumer choices such as those made for a particular brand, service, or store.
For example, customers may need to choose where to shop, when to buy a product,
and which brand to purchase. On the company side, firms also may need to think
about what type of customer to target, how to cross-sell and retain customers, what
1
price to charge, how to assess the effectiveness of promotions and advertising, etc. In
recent years, these questions have become important in customer relationship man-
agement (CRM).
A basis for brand choice research is deeply rooted in operations research techniques
such as statistics, mathematical modeling, optimization, and simulation. The statis-
tical techniques most commonly used are maximum likelihood estimation, Bayesian
theory, and statistics tests. The most popular simulation method used is the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo simulation. These statistical methods are used on a more detailed
level to estimate parameters. Pertinent optimization techniques such as dynamic pro-
gramming, can be expressed as a Markov decision process (MDP) and used to model
the dynamic brand choice process. At a market share management level, game models
are used for getting the best strategy such as advertisement effort. Nonlinear pro-
gramming is embedded in the maximum likelihood estimation. Brand choice actually
is a difficult problem that needs to be addressed. The reasons for the difficulty are
discussed in detail in Section 1.1.3.
To motivate our interest, we note that Daniel McFadden of the University of
California at Berkeley shared the 2000 Nobel Prize in economic science with James
Heckman of the University of Chicago because of their theoretical analysis of discrete
choices. Others who have made important contributions in this area include Griliches
(1957), Thurstone (1927), Marschak (1960), Luce (1959), Tversky and Kahneman
(1974,1981), Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990), Manski (1977), and Train (1998).
The current research on brand choice has many applications, some of which are
transportation, health care, production development, credit card profile design, in-




In this section, some important application areas are listed to show the practical rel-
evance of this research topic.
Transportation. In the 1970s, Peter Diamond and Robert Hall at MIT devel-
oped a separable-utility, multi-stage budgeting, representative consumer model for
the complexity of consumer transportation decisions, including frequency, timing,
and destination of shopping trips. Since the 1970s, some researchers at UC Berkely,
Mcfadden, Train, and Manski, have been attracted to this problem domain and sub-
sequently developed useful tools for transportation planning based on microeconomic
analysis of individual decisions. Also at MIT, Hauser, Koppelman, and Tybout (1981)
have also done research about transportation and facility location based on discrete
choice models.
Health Care. Health care is expensive for almost everyone, especially in the
United Sates. Cardon and Hendel (2001) structurally estimated a model of health
insurance and health care choices using data on single individuals. They tested for
unobservable links between health insurance status and health care consumption.
Heckman (1979) has also done some research on health care provider choice based
on discrete choice models. Ryan and Gerard (2003) provided a good review about
discrete choice as it relates to health care economics.
Banking and Insurance. Allenby and Ginter (1995) used a Bayesian hierarchi-
cal model to study credit card profile choices. Their data was from an experiment in
which partial profiles of credit cards were presented to 946 respondents under 14,799
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observations. Greene (1998) examined three models for sample selection that are
relevant to modeling credit scoring by commercial banks. They used a binary choice
model to examine the bank’s decision of whether or not to extend credit. Stango
(2000) have also studied credit card issuers with “fixed rate” and “variable rate.”
Automobile Industry. McCarthy et al. (1992) studied the loyalty and the
switch rate of automobile brands. Berry et al. (1995) developed techniques for em-
pirically analyzing demand and supply in product markets and then applied these
techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry.
Household Products. There is a great deal of research on household product
brand choices such items as toilet paper, ketchup, soup, and laundry detergent. Ka-
makura et al. (1996) studied the preference heterogeneity in the peanut butter market
using a nested logit model. Gonul and Srinivasan (1996) also studied the effect of
coupons on purchase behavior of disposable diapers, using a stochastic programming
model (MDP). Erdem and Keane (1996) used decision making under uncertainty
technology to capture dynamic brand choice processes in turbulent consumer goods
markets (liquid detergent). Erdem et al. assumed a customer choice of a brand ac-
cording to dynamic programming to maximize the utility function. Dillon and Gupta
(1996) used a segment-level model to study and categorize volume and brand choice
at the same time by employing a nested logit model.
The current literature contains an array of models for brand choice. The most
popular of these models including logit, nested logit, probit, Bayesian methods, struc-
tural models, and dynamic models, will be reviewed in the next section.
4
1.1.2 Overview of Model Methodology
In this section, we review major methodologies described in the literature for mod-
eling brand choice. All models are categorized into two classes: (1) a static model,
and (2) a dynamic model. A static model is akin to a picture of customers’ choices
where there are no time and space changes. A dynamic model is like a video of cus-
tomers’ choice processes where there are time and space changes. We begin with the
logit/probit model.
(1) Static Models. The type of probability models of interest here include the
logit model, nested logit model, and probit model.
(a) Logit Model
The logit model computes the probability of choosing a brand as a function of the
attributes of all brands available. Hlavac and Little (1969) used a somewhat simi-
lar model to the logit model to calculate the probability that an automobile buyer
purchases a car at a particular dealership. Silk and Urban (1978) imbedded a logit
model in their pre-test-market evaluation process for new products. Punj and Staelin
(1978) applied this model to students choosing a business school. Gensch and Recker
(1979) compared the fitting ability of a logit model with that of regression for shop-
pers choosing grocery stores.
Marschak (1960) showed that those following axioms imply that the model is con-
sistent with utility maximization. The relation of the logit formula to the distribution
of unobserved utility (as opposed to the characteristics of choice probabilities) was
developed by Marley, as cited by Luce et al. (1965). McFadden (1974) showed that
the logit formula for the choice probabilities necessarily implies that unobserved util-
ity is an extreme value. In his Nobel lecture, McFadden (2001) provided a fascinating
5
historical review of the development of this model.
Assumed axioms: Consumers must choose one from a brands set S that contains
different brands. Other assumptions include
1. Brand k ∈ S has a utility function:
Uk = Vk + εk
Vk and εk are the deterministic and random components of utility function, re-
spectively.
2. Among those brands, the customer chooses a brand with the maximum utility
function, i.e., The brand i is chosen because
pi = P{Ui ≥ Uk, k ∈ S}
3. The random component of a utility function is the double exponential random
variable (extreme value variable).
P{εk < ε} = e−e
−ε
From the foregoing assumptions, Theil (1971) and McFadden (1974) derived the






A nested logit model is suitable when the set of brands can be partitioned or grouped
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into subsets, called “nests.” In fact, this is a hierarchical (multi-level) logit model.
Wen and Koppelman (2001) derived various cross-nested models as special cases of
the general nested logit (GNL).
(c) Probit
Marschak (1960) translated economic terms into a utility. Hausman and Wise (1978),
and Daganzo (1979) elucidated the generality of the specification for representing var-
ious aspects of choice behavior. Utility is decomposed into observed and unobserved
parts Vj, εj, respectively; Vj and εj are defined as the same as the above axioms (1).
An example of a probit model is exhibited in the following. Consider the vector
composed of each εj = εj1, ..., εjm. We assume that εj is distributed normally with a













The covariance can depend on the variables faced by a customer. ′ is the transpose
of a vector. The choice probability is
pi = P (Vji + εji > Vjk + εjk, k 6= i) =
∫
P (Vji + εji > Vjk + εjk, k 6= i)φ(εj)dεj
where the integral is over all values of εj.
(d) Structural Models
Structural models are decomposed into two main classes: structural equation models
and hierarchical models. These models mirror the analysis and observation processes
of human beings.
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A structural equation model (SEM) is a general statistical modeling technique
to establish relationships among variables. This type of model is more often used
in customer physiology research. Baumgartner and Homburg (1996) provided a very
good review of SEM. It appears that the hierarchical model has become more popular
in marketing research because it is a structural model that matches the structure of
marketing data and MCMC technologies.
In a hierarchical model, a hierarchy describes a model that consists of units
grouped into different levels. In these models, there are a number of lower level
units within each higher level unit. Especially in the case of the logit or probit model
with a binary (0,1) response, this is no longer adequate. Results by Rodriguez and
Goldman (1995) illustrated this problem. Goldstein and Rasbash (1996) described
this model, too.
In the sequel, we present an overview of a three-level logit model: A three-level
logit model is a two-level logit model with a lower level regression for each βi, the
parameter associates choice attributes.
First level: Here, observation yi indicates if brand i is chosen. yi as a Bernoulli
random variable with success probability yi|pi, yi = 1 with probability pi. yi = 1
means brand i is chosen. yi = 0 means brand i is not chosen.
The second level: It is a logit model. xi = (xi1, ..., xik)
′ are the choice attributes;
βi = (βi1, ..., βik)











where zi = (zi1, ..., zim), ε ∼ N(0, σ2). The three-level probit model is a two-level
probit model with a regression or distribution for βi. The third level is a linear re-
gression for βi, where βi = Γz
′
i + ε.
McCulloch and Rossi (1994) used a hierarchical probit model. Allenby and Gin-
ter (1995) employed a hierarchical logit model to study heterogeneity. Subsequently,
Yang and Allenby (2003) used a hierarchical auto regression model to address the
social connection.
(2) Dynamic Models
The purpose of a dynamic model is to track the customer choice process, to observe
brand choice over various time periods.
Rust (1987) first formulated a simple regenerative model for bus engine replace-
ment. His model described the behavior of the maintenance plan at the Madison
Metropolitan bus company.
Erdem and Keane (1996) combined the Monte Carlo, maximum likelihood esti-
mator, and dynamic programming methods to study the customer forward-looking
brand choice process. Their application focused on the household production mar-
ket. Erdem et al. (2004) also considered quantity and brand choice together using a
dynamic programming model to calculate the utility function.
Gonul and Shi (1998) used the estimable structural dynamic programming model
to maximize direct mailer profit. Their model combines the customers’ behavior and
9
company’s decisions.
Imai et al. (2005) also extended the dynamic programming framework with the
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to solve the resultant dynamic pro-
gramming problem and estimate the parameters conjunctively.
Considering the importance of dynamic choice models, our research examines the
brand choice problem as it may occur at the strategic management level. We propose
a stochastic differential-jump game model as an appropriate framework. This is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 2.
1.1.3 Complexity of Brand Choice
It is apparent that brand choice decision involves a considerable array of factors. For
example, the reason that a customer may choose a brand is affected by many market
elements such as objective (motivating) environments, coupon, price improvement,
demographics, internet access, individual habits, etc. Some of these elements that
complicate the brand choice problem will now be brifly examined in the following
section.
1. Motivating Environments. A study of this factor is useful for adding inde-
pendent variables that reflect the personal and environmental conditions existing in
everyday life, for which goods or services are used.
Some authors have included “situational” variables, operationalized as variation
in activity, or in a type of objective environment for activity (e.g., Belk (1975), Rat-
neshwar and Shocker (1991), Miller and Ginter (1979), Dickson (1982)).
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Yang et al. (2002) also studied the effects of objective environment using data col-
lected by the Consumer Insights Group at the Miller Brewing Company, a major U.S.
beer producer. They found that 1) across individuals the objective environment is
associated with heterogeneous, not homogeneous, motivating conditions; 2) within an
individual, motivating conditions may change with variation in the objective environ-
ment; and 3) motivating conditions are related to preferences for specific attributes.
2. Online/Offline. Internet marketing may change customer choice behavior
and habit. Andrews and Currim (2000), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000), Brynjolfsson
and Smith (2000), Burke et al. (1992), Degeratu et al. (2000), and Shankar et al.
(2003), conducted empirical research exploring consumer behavior in an online envi-
ronment.
Andrews and Currim (2000) found that the brand loyalty coefficient in a multino-
mial logit model is lower for online versus offline grocery shopping. However, in the
study, online shoppers tended to select from a smaller consideration set of brands,
thereby remaining loyal to a smaller number of brands.
3. Price Promotion. Price promotions are short-term cuts offered to consumers.
Many researchers such as Guadagni and Little (1983) found the customer’s loyalty
relates to price promotion. Rju et al. (1990) pointed out that theoretical analysis
shows that if all brands in the product market have high brand loyalty, none of the
companies will find it profitable to use price promotions. Furthermore, a brand’s like-
lihood of using pricing promotions increases with the number of competing brands in
the product market. Rju et al. (1990) studied brand loyalty using grocery store data.
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4. Coupon. Feinberg et al. (1992) and Morrison et al. (1971) derived the long-
run brand choice probability for couponed brands in an equilibrium market using a
Markov process model. Dhar et al. (1996) conducted experiments in the UCLA Stu-
dent Union focusing on soft drinks and yogurt. They considered three different kinds
of coupons using the probit model. Their results showed that coupons can increase a
brand’s share significantly, but may not increase profit very much.
5. Demography. Allenby and Rossi (1991) and Gupta et al. (1994), introduced
demographic variables in brand choice models. Kalyanam et al. (1997) incorporated
demographic variables in brand choice using data for ketchup, coffee, liquid detergent,
and laundry detergent. They found the following: (1) There is a negative relationship
between household income and its price sensitivity (2) the presence of children will
increase the probability of choosing large size packaged products in the same category.
6. Habit. Brand choice is affected by the previous experience of customers in
two ways. One way is loyalty and the other is habit. Heckman (1981,1991) call this
the phenomenon habit persistence. Creating a dynamic model that includes past,
present, and future brand choices is very difficult. Roy et al. (1996) developed a gen-
eral dynamic brand choice model that, in fact, is a logit model. They did research on
ketchup data in a Springfield, Missouri, market. The model consists of heterogeneity,
state dependence, and habit (loyalty).
1.2 Research Motivation and Objectives
Our research focuses on the dynamic nature of the brand choice process, models
for the choice difference among customers (i.e., heterogeneity), and applications in
production-inventory systems. In this dissertation, we model different aspects of
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brand choice using an assortment of approaches.
This research is divided into three components. First, from a high market man-
agement level, the accumulation of brand choice of individuals is expressed as the
market share at the management level. For example, a company may wish to design
the best advertising policy in order to attract more customers to select its own brands.
In chapter two, a stochastic differential-jump game is used to model this situation.
In the second component of this research, we observe that each customer is different
even though all reasonable customers are assumed to make decisions in a manner that
mirrors the fundamental dynamic programming principle. We model the differences
among customers using a robust hierarchical logit/probit model. This is treated in
Chapter 3. Because of the many parameters to be estimated, Markov Chain Monte
Carlo simulation (MCMC) is proposed as a suitable method. The third component,
namely, application is discussed in Chapter 4. The brand choice model now has a
new important application area, namely, dynamic pricing. We use the logit/probit as
the customer’s response in a manufacturing-inventory-marketing system, which inte-
grates information of manufacturing, inventory, and marketing together. In following
sections, we present an overview of each research topic and highlight their method-
ologies as well as their resultant contributions to the thesis topic.
In Figure (1), the dissertation layout and each component of the thesis research
are displayed. The brand choice is an interaction process between companies and cus-
tomers. Each different customer has his/her own profile. A company has to consider
the market segmentation and maximizing its revenue. These issues are inputs of the
brand choice problem. We explain the definition, application areas, and complexity
of brand choice in Chapter 1. The core of this problem is the dynamic interaction
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Figure 1: Overview of research structure.
between companies and customers. In Figure (1) business represents companies. Fur-
ther, we address three subtopics: stochastic differential-jump game model for market
competition, heterogeneity of customers, and dynamic pricing application.
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1.2.1 A Stochastic Differential-Jump Game Model for Brand Competi-
tion
In Chapter 2, we consider the problem of modeling the brand competition problem
via some novel approaches. This is considered a significant departure from classical
approaches, with the potential for useful contributions to the brand competition lit-
erature. We begin by providing some concepts of a stochastic differential-jump game.
A stochastic differential-jump game is an extension of a stochastic differential game
(Basar and Olsder (1995)) that belongs to a subset of the general class of dynamic
games originating from systems theory, optimal control, and dynamic programming.
One such game includes a number of state variables that describe the states of a
dynamic system. In a stochastic differential game, the evolution of the state variables
is described by a set of diffusion equations. In the stochastic differential-jump game,
however, a mark-time Poisson process (Hanson (2006)) is added for each state vari-
able equation. Historically, differential game theories have been studied extensively
by Isaacs, Friedman, Leitmann, Krasovskii, Subbotin, Basar, and Olsder.
Moorthy (1985, 1993) and Rao (1990) surveyed game theory modeling applica-
tions in marketing. Jørgensen (1986), Rao (1990), and Moorthy (1993) discussed
pricing strategies. Dolan et al. (1985), and Mahajan et al. (1990) studied marketing
strategies in new product diffusion models. The production-marketing interface was
surveyed by Eliashberg and Steinberg (1993) and Gaimon (1988), while Jørgensen
(1982a), Erickson (1995a, 1995b), Moorthy (1993), and Feichtinger et al. (1994) con-
sidered their applications to advertising strategies.
The Markov chain approximation method developed by Kushner et al. (1990) and
Kushner (2002, 2004) is the current widely used method for a variety of stochastic
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control problems in continuous time where a Markov chain is generated from a diffu-
sion equation.
Prasad et al. (2003, 2004), Bass, Prasad, and Sethi (2005) have conducted some
recent research on stochastic differential game models applied to market competition.
Our survey of the literature indicates the absence of publications that employ
a diffusion-jump process to model market share in the market competition area. To
our knowledge, the latest report of a stochastic differential game applied to marketing
competition is Bass et al. (2005), who studied firms that want to increase the sales
of their brands through advertising and that typically have the choice of capturing
market share from their competitors through brand advertising, or of increasing pri-
mary demand for the category through generic advertising.
1.2.2 Heterogeneity in Markets
In general, heterogeneity is used to refer to the differences among customers. In
studying heterogeneity in markets, the use of hierarchical models has been found
to be a popular framework. For example, researchers have studied several types of
first level models where a regression model is used in the second level. Examples
of this approach include a first level normal linear regression model (Blattberg and
George (1991)), a first level logit model (Allenby and Lenk (1994), Allenby and Ginter
(1995)), a first level probit model (McCulloch and Rossi (1994)), a first level Poisson
distribution model (Neelamegham and Chintagunta (1999)), and a first level gener-
alized gamma distribution model (Allenby, Leone, and Jen (1999)). All models show
that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across units in various marketing
data sets. Customer segmentation is also related to heterogeneity. For example, price
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coefficients could be different for each group of customers. In general, it has been
found that wealthy customers are not concerned about price as much as less wealthy
customers. In current marketing research literature, no robust regression models are
used at the bottom of the hierarchical model. It appears that focusing on level con-
tents may lead to opportunities for improving of results in heterogeneity markets.
Chapter 3 discusses a set of primary factors causing heterogeneity. An instructive
list is as follows: (1) brand loyality/pereference heterogeneity, (2) price heterogeneity,
(3) structural heterogeneity, (4) demographic heterogeneity, (5) scale heterogeneity,
and (6) spatial heterogeneity.
Because too many parameters must be estimated, MCMC is considered as a suit-
able estimation method (Rowe (2002)). The MCMC method is a simulation technique
that generates samples (multiple observations) from the target distribution in the fol-
lowing way: the transition probability of a Markov process is specified by its limiting
invariant distribution (target distribution). The Markov chain is then iterated a large
number of times, and the outputs are samples from the target distribution. The first
method, the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm is from Metropolis et al. (1953)
and Hastings (1970). In this algorithm, the next value of the Markov chain is gen-
erated from a proposed density and then accepted or rejected according to the ratio
of the density at the candidate point divided by the density at the current point.
Another MCMC method is the Gibbs sampling algorithm, introduced by Geman and
Geman (1984), in which the next draw is obtained by sampling sub-components of a
random vector from a sequence of conditional distributions.
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1.2.3 Dynamic Pricing in Production-Inventory Environment
As was shown in Figure (1), an application area for brand choice model considered in
this research is dynamic pricing, which is an important method for revenue manage-
ment (Talluri and van Ryzin (2006)). Some traditional application areas of revenue
management include airlines, hotels, car rentals, railroads, etc. Non-traditional ap-
plication areas are energy, broadcasting, health care, manufacturing, apparel, restau-
rants, etc.
A firm’s revenue management problem can be posed as the maximization of its
total expected revenue by selecting appropriate dynamic controls. There are two
objectives of this problem: “dynamic pricing” and “capacity control.” In the first
objective, “dynamic pricing,” the company is assumed to be a monopolist with power
to influence the demand for each product by varying its price. In this way, the com-
pany’s policy is to choose a dynamic price for each of its products in order to optimize
expected revenue. In the second objective, “capacity control,” prices are assumed to
be fixed either by the competition or through a higher-order administrator agency. In
this case, the company’s decision is to choose a dynamic capacity allocation rule that
controls when to accept new requests for each of its products. Our work considers
three aspects:
(1) The model of a demand process. A demand process is complex, and can not
be assumed as a Poisson process with a simple parameter λ, (Gallego and van Ryzin
(1994, 1997) and Feng and Gallego (2000)). The demand process is modeled here as
a diffusion process.
(2) On a retail level, our model combines the responses of customers. Most models
make a common, simplifying, and potentially problematic assumption: that consumer
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demand for each product is completely independent of the controls being applied by
the seller. Demand processes are modeled by determining which exogenously arriving
requests are to be accepted or rejected. Talluri et al. (2004) partially addressed choice
behavior issues where demand depends on the current price (the control input). Thus,
customers must make a binary choice: to buy or not to buy. This is a logit/probit
issue.
(3) On the manufacturing level, the production capacity jump situation is also
considered in Chapter 4.
1.3 Contributions of this Work
In this section, we outline our primary contributions after presenting an overview of
the research components. The main contributions of this work are: (1) the develop-
ment of a stochastic differential-jump game (SDJG) model for a more detailed study
of brand competition, in which a customer choice behavior is modeled and observed
on a strategic management level. The concept of SDJG is developed explicitly and
applied to the brand choice problem for the first time. The game model not only
models continuous state variables, but also discrete event inputs. (2) A robust hi-
erarchical logit/probit model is proposed for market heterogeneity, which is a more
detailed model for the study of choice differences among customers. The robust hier-
archical logit/probit model improves significantly log margin density (LMD), which
is the classic performance measure in MCMC. Further, this model predicts more pre-
cisely compared with a general hierarchical logit/probit model because we have more
precise regression estimation. (3) The application of brand choice models in the cur-
rent topic of dynamic pricing. These models are embedded in production-inventory
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systems which jump events in production systems are also considered. An explanta-
tion of the foregoing contributions is presented in the sequel.
1.3.1 A Stochastic Differential-Jump Game Model
The evolution of market share states can be modeled with a jump-diffusion process
when there are discrete event inputs. Brand competition is modeled by a stochastic
differential-jump game model in this situation. In a stochastic differential-jump game,
state equations are represented as jump-diffusion processes. The specific benefit of
this model is that it can model continuous and discontinuous states together. To
circumvent the difficulty of obtaining a closed-form solution for the resultant general
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, we introduce the Markov Chain Approxi-
mation Algorithm in the examples considered.
The market share of a brand depends on elements such as price, advertising ef-
fort, and quality. The objective is to find optimal policies such as advertising effort to
maximize total profit. To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first application
of a jump-diffusion process in marketing competition research.
Our work begins with the definition of the terminology of a stochastic differential-
jump game, followed by the development of a first application of a stochastic differential-
jump game model for market competition.
Definition 1.3.1 Stochastic differential-jump game: the stochastic differential-jump
game is a game with state equations including mark-time Poisson processes. The state
of dynamic system i at t,
dxi(t) = fi(t, x(t), U(t))dt + σi(t)dWi(t) + dPi(t), x(0) = x0.
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where U(t) = (u1(t), ..., ui−1(t), ui(t), ui+1(t), ..., uN(t)), x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xi−1(t), xi(t), xi+1(t),
..., xN(t)), f(x, U, t) = (f1(x, U, t), ..., fi−1(x, U, t)), fi(x, U, t), fi+1(x, U, t), .., fN(x, U, t)),
Wi(t) is a Brownian motion. dPi(t) is a mark-time Poisson process whose rate is
λJi(x, u, t) and whose jump amplitude probability density is ηi(z). When the system
is in state (t, x(t)) and players select their controls u1(t), ..., uN(t), player i receives
the payoff rate gi(x(t), U(t)).
The objective for player i is







i (x(t)))dt + e
−rTU(X(T )
}
where r is the discount coefficient.
Definition 1.3.2 Nash equilibrium: when player i expects the other N − 1 players
to select their Nash equilibrium strategy. Formally, an N-tuple (u∗1(t), · · ·, u∗N(t)) of
strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Vi(u
∗
1(t), · · ·, u∗i (t), · · ·, u∗N(t)) ≥ Vi(u∗1(t), · · ·, u∗i−1(t), ui(t), u∗i+1(t), · · ·, u∗N(t))
and
∀u∗i (t) ∈ U(t), ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
We also define
u∗(t) = (u∗1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗i−1(x(t)), u∗i (x(t)), u∗i+1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗N(x(t))).
Theorem 1.3.1 Suppose that N-tupe (u1, · · ·, uN)of functions u∗i : [0, T ] is given, and
(i) there is a x(t) ∈ X of the initial value problem
dxi(t) = fi(x(t), ui(x(t))dt + σi(t)dWi(t) + dPi(t)
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(ii) there exists a continuously differentiable function Vi : [0, T ] × X −→ R, such
that the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are satisfied for all (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]×X:
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t


















∂2V ∗i (x, t)
∂x2












where e = (e1, e2, ..., eN) is the (1 × N) indicating vector, σi,j(t) is the covariance
of xi and xj.nw and np are the number of Brownian motions and Poisson processes
respectively, λJk is the rate of kth mark-time Poisson process. ηk(z) is the probability
density of jump amplitude z of kth mark-time Poisson process. Q is the domain of z.
(iii) the boundary conditions
Vi(T, x) = U(xi(T ))
are satisfied for all x ∈ X and i ∈ {1, ..., N}. If u∗i (x(t)) is a maximizer of the
right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, then u∗i (x(t)) is the Nash
equilibrium solution, where σ is the volatility matrix with dimension (N ×N).
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The following model is used in the example of Chapter 2.
























dt + σ1(t)dW (t) + dP (t)
x(t) + y(t) = 1
ρ1 =
exp (β10 + u1(t)β1)
exp(β10 + u1(t)β1) + exp(β20 + u2(t)β2)
ρ2 =
exp (β20 + u2(t)β2)
exp(β10 + u1(t)β1) + exp(β20 + u2(t)β2)
(1.3.2)
where x(t), y(t) are the sale rates (expressed as a fraction of the total market) at
time t, u(t) is the advertising expenditure rate (effort), r is the discount coefficient,
and m1, m2, c1, c2 are profit coefficients and cost coefficients, respectively. ρ1, ρ2 are
advertisement response coefficients. exp uβP
exp uβ
is a logit model used as a response func-





y determine the rate at which consumers are lost due
to competitor efforts.
1.3.2 A Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Logit/Probit
Heterogeneity is an important phenomenon in marketing research, but it is difficult
to model. A hierarchical structure matches the observation data of heterogeneity.
The advantage of this type of model is that it provides a method to scrutinize ev-
ery detailed element of a problem and heterogeneity model for different customers.
A hierarchical model combines the features of products and the characteristics of
customers. MCMC is a simulation methodology that makes the Bayesian technique
more practical. MCMC has some advantages compared with maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) when the number of parameters is large. MCMC draws samples
of those parameters needed to estimate.
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Logit and probit models are simple and well-known discrete brand choice models.
A hierarchical probit or logit model is a multi-level model in which the top level is
the probit or logit, and the bottom level is a regression model. A robust hierarchical
Bayesian logit/probit model is presented. By robustness, we mean the model works
well with extreme outlier data because of the long tail t distribution used. Robustness
makes the estimation of parameters more stable than otherwise possible using MLE.
Our work on this topic includes: (1) a review of heterogeneity in marketing; (2)
the development of a robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model; and (3) an
experiment to validate our robust model using bank credit card choice data.The ex-
perimental results show that robust hierarchical models are better based on LMD
and prediction precision. The details of this model are presented in Chapter 3. The
model for robust hierarchical logit/probit is












βî = Γzî + ξî,
εîj ∼ Norm(0, σ
2),
ξî ∼ Norm(0, Σ/wî),
wî ∼ Gamma(ν1/2, ν1/2).
(1.3.3)
and the remaining variables as defined below:
yîj : the latent variable of profile j valuated by the respondent î,
xîj : vector of independent variables associated with profile j for respondent î, it is a
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(1× k)′ vector, k is the number of properties of a profile,
βî : respondent î-specific coefficients, βî = (βî1, ..., βîk)
′,
εîj : i.i.d norm error term Norm(0, σ
2),
Γ : matrix that relates βî to the value of zî,
zî : respondent’s information, is a (1, 3) dimension vector,
ξî : unobserved heterogeneity component,
wî : the weight, Gamma distribution Gamma(ν1/2, ν1/2).
1.3.3 Dynamic Pricing Models
Dynamic pricing is important to revenue management. Our analysis of dynamic
pricing is based on various types of Poisson processes. Because of its complexity and
dynamics, the demand process is modeled as a diffusion process. We analyze dynamic
pricing problems by considering various scenarios. As an extension of the controlled
demand process, certain problems in production and inventory are also investigated.
These extended models are solved by employing stochastic dynamic programming.
Work on this topic includes (1) dynamic pricing models presented with λ, and
customer choice; (2) an extended dynamic pricing model with a production-inventory
system solved using a stochastic optimal control framework; and (3) jump effects on
this production-inventory system using a mark-time Poisson process.
In extended production-inventory systems, λ(t) is the demand rate, I(t) is the
inventory rate, X(t) is the production rate, h(t) is the inventory cost in unit time,
c(t) is the production cost in unit time, q(t) is the price, Q(t) is the capacity, φ is the
demand at each arrival, σ is the volatility, α, θ are constants, and W (t) and dP (t)
are Browian motion and mark-time processes respectively. V ∗(X, λ) is the maximum
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cumulative profit from 0 to t T at state X, λ. Then, our resultant model may be
represented as:










dX(t) = f(X(t), λ(t), q(t))dt + dP (t)
dλ(t) = α (θ − λ(t)) dt + σ
√
λ(t)dW (t)
I(t) = max[X(t)− λ(t)logit(q(t))φ, 0]
I0 = 0, X(t) ≤ Q(t), I(t), X(t), λ(t) ∈ R+.
(1.3.4)
or










dX(t) = f(X(t), λ(t), q(t))dt + dP (t)
dλ(t) = α (θ − λ(t)) dt + σ
√
λ(t)dW (t)
I(t) = max[X(t)− λ(t)probit(q(t))φ, 0]
I0 = 0, X(t) ≤ Q(t), I(t), X(t), λ(t) ∈ R+.
(1.3.5)
Conclusion: In this dissertation, we develop a new game model, namely, stochastic
differential-jump game model and apply it to the brand’s market competition in a
specific situation. Our robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model has more
precise estimation and predictive ability. In our examples in Chapter 3, the AIC,
BIC, and LMD are improved by 60% in robust regression level. The prediction error
is reduced by around 80%. Our continuous-time dynamic pricing model in Chapter
4 is suitable in different situations: jump, or no-jump cases.
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CHAPTER II
A STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL-JUMP GAME MODEL
FOR BRAND COMPETITION
A brand’s market share depends on elements such as price, advertising, quality, entry
of new brands into the market, and availability of funds. The introduction of new
brands and the availability of funds can be viewed as discrete events where market
share states can be modeled by a jump-diffusion process.
The objective of this study is to find optimal policies such as pricing or advertising
effort in some jump event situations using a stochastic differential-jump game model
where state equations are jump-diffusion processes. The specific benefit of this model
is the ability to model continuous states and discrete events together. An extensive
review of the literature indicates that this is the first application of a jump-diffusion
process in market competition.
In the current research, brand competition is modeled using a stochastic differential-
jump game model. Due to the difficulty of using a closed-form solution for a gen-
eral Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, the Markov chain approximation al-
gorithm is used in these examples.
This chapter considers (1) a definition of terminology and a framework for a
stochastic differential-jump game model and (2) the first application of a stochastic
differential-jump game model for marketing competition.
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2.1 Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern laid the foundation of modern game theory in their
book “Theory of Games and Economics Behavior” published in 1944. Since then,
the application of game theoretic analysis in many fields such as economics, biology,
engineering, operations research, and politics has become more popular.
Dynamic game theory, including differential games and stochastic differential
games, has been developed from static games. In this chapter, we present explic-
itly the definition of a stochastic differential-jump game.
Differential games belong to a subset of the general class of dynamic games origi-
nating from systems theory, optimal control, and dynamic programming. Such games
include a number of state variables that describe states of a dynamic system over a
period of time. Historically, differential game theories were developed by Isaacs,
Friedman, Leitmann, Krasovskii, Subbotin, Basar, and Olsder. Differential games
are popularly used in economic and management applications. Jørgensen (1982a,
1982b, 1982c) summarized some applications of differential games in advertising. In
the early 1980s, only a few works dealt with pricing, but they led to continued re-
search of competitive advertising and pricing strategies, for example, the application
of games theory in marketing channels, as well as the interaction of marketing with
other functional areas such as production, capacity expansion, and finance. Moor-
thy (1985, 1993) and Rao (1990) surveyed game theoretic modelings in marketing.
Jørgensen (1986), Rao (1990), and Moorthy (1993) discussed pricing strategies. Dolan
et al. (1985), and Mahajan et al. (1990) studied marketing strategies in new product
diffusion models. The production-marketing interface is surveyed by Eliashberg and
Steinberg (1993), and Gaimon (1988). Jørgensen (1982a), Erickson (1995a, 1995b),
Moorthy (1993), and Feichtinger et al. (1994) studied advertising strategies.
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A stochastic differential game is a differential game plus a stochastic item (Brow-
nian motion) in its state equation. Cellini and Lambertini (2003) illustrated a differ-
ential oligopoly game where firms compete with homogeneous goods in the market
phase and invest in advertising activities aimed at increasing the consumers’ reser-
vation price. They derived the open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibrium, and
showed that the properties of the equilibrium depend on the curvature of the market
demand function. The comparative assessment of these equilibria showed that the
firms’ advertising efforts are greater in the open-loop equilibrium than in the closed-
loop equilibrium.
Prasad and Sethi (2004) analyzed optimal advertising decisions in a duopolis-
tic market, where each firm’s market share was assumed to depend on its own and
its competitor’s advertising decisions, and was subject to stochastic disturbances.
Their model for advertising was based on Sethi’s stochastic advertising model and
the Lanchester model of combat. Bass et al. (2005) studied a similar model for firms
that wanted to increase the sales of their brands through advertising.
Pricing and advertising policies in market situations may be exposed to external
jump events. External jump events exist in the real world. For example, hurricanes
create an emergency need for many products. In this case, we can reduce the effort
of advertising. If there are new entrants in the market, advertising efforts need to
be increased to maintain market share. In addition to those random events, some
planned events can also affect the system. The occurrence of this type of event is
modeled by the mark-time Poisson process.
A stochastic differential-jump game model is a game model where state processes
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are defined by a jump-diffusion process. Jump-diffusion processes were first used by
Merton in optimal investment and more recently were used in asset pricing as well.
But a jump-diffusion process is seldom used in the game framework to study price
policy, and advertising effort in external jump event situations. To the best of our
knowledge, the current research is the first time the stochastic differential-jump game
model has been developed and applied in market competition.
2.2 Review of Market Share Model
In this section, the advertising effect and market share model is reviewed. Consider
an N-firm oligopoly and let xi(t) denote the market share of firm i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
The state space X̃ is represented by




Although Lanchester (1956) developed a model for military combat, the model
has also been found useful in marketing competition. The advertising effort rate of
firm i at time t is denoted by ai(t). Let the initial market shares be xi(0) = xi0 such
that (x10, ..., xN0) ∈ X̃. fi(ai(t)) is the market share gain by the advertising effort of
competitor i.
A general version of the Lanchester dynamics is
dxi(t)
dt
= [1− xi(t)]fi(ai(t))− xi(t)
N∑
j=1,j 6=i











= [m− xi(t)]fi(ai(t))− xi(t)
N∑
j=1,j 6=i









e−rit[πixi(t)− Ci(ai(t))]dt + e−riTUi(xi(T ))
πi is the constant unit margin of firm i and Ci(ai(t)) is the cost of advertising
effort. ai(t) is the policy of firm i. Ui(xi(T )) is the utility function of the final state.
The policy could be the price or advertising effort.
The Vidale-Wolfe model (Vidale and Wolfe (1957)) is
dx(t)
dt
= ρu(t)[m− s(t)]− δx(t)
where u(t) is the advertising expenditure rate, ρ is a response constant, and δ is a
market share decay constant.







dt + σ(x)dW (t)
where x(t) is the sales rate (expressed as a fraction of the total market), u(t) is the
advertising expenditure rate, ρ is a response constant, and δ is a market share decay
constant. The parameter ρ may be conceptualized as brand characteristics, deter-
mining the result of advertising, while δ determines the rate at which consumers are
lost as the result of a competitor’s effort. W (t) is the Brownian motion.
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1− y(t)− ρ2u(x, y)
√
y(t)
where x(t), y(t) are the sales rate (expressed as a fraction of the total market);
u(x, y), abbreviations for u(x(t), y(t)) is the advertising expenditure rate, and ρ1, ρ2
are response parameters.
Prasad and Sethi (2003) considered a duopoly extension of the Sethi model. The
deterministic part of their dynamics differs from Sorger’s model in having a parameter












































dt− σ(x, y)dW (t)
The meaning of these parameters follows the definitions of the Sethi model. ρ1, ρ2
are response parameters. δ is a market share decay constant. σ(x, y) is a volatility.
2.3 Markov Chain Approximation Algorithm
The finite difference method is a basic method to solve partial differential equations.
The Markov chain approximation method was invented by Kushner and Dupuis (1990)
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and Kushner (2002, 2004). The Markov chain approximation method comes from the
finite difference method. The primary characteristic of the Markov chain approxima-
tion method is its nice convergence property.
The system is defined by dx(t) = f(x, u)dt+σ(x)dW (t). The objective function
is:
V ∗(x0, t0) = max
{





where x(t) is the state variable, u(t) is a control variable, and W (t) is a Brownian
















+ g(x, u, t)
}
(2.3.1)
Here, the derivative can be calculated by the finite difference. The central differ-




V ∗(x + h, t)− 2V ∗(x, t) + V ∗(x− h, t)
h2
Equation (2.3.1) can be approximated by the backward Euler approximation. h
is the step length in the x direction.
V ∗(x, tk−1) = V












(x, tk) + g(x, u, tk)
}
(2.3.2)
We use the finite difference for first order and second derivatives on equation
(2.3.2). So,
V ∗(x, tk−1) = max
u
{
pk(x, x|uk−1)V ∗(x, tk) + pk(x, x + h|uk−1)V ∗(x + h, tk)
+ pk(x, x− h|uk−1)V ∗(x− h, tk) + ∆tkg(x, u, tk)
}
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where these transition probabilities are













), [fk]+ = max{+fk, 0}










, fk = f(tk, u)
(2.3.3)
Equation (2.3.3) is the exact result in Hanson (2006). Kushner and Dupuis (2001),
provided some conditions for the algorithm’s convergence.
2.4 Introduction to a Stochastic Differential-Jump Game
A jump event is added to the stochastic differential game model so that it becomes a
stochastic differential-jump game (SDJG). Jump-diffusion processes are widely used
in mathematical finance, especially in credit risk analysis.
This model is used for brand competition when there are uncertain events in mar-
kets, scheduled or random, and impulse inputs with a positive or negative impact.
This model has more capability than a stochastic differential game model because it
uses only diffusion processes. A diffusion process is a continuous process that can not
model the discrete change. The mark-time Poisson process makes up the shortage of
a diffusion process.
Definition 2.4.1 Stochastic differential-jump game: A stochastic differential-jump
game can be defined simply as a stochastic differential game with jump events. The
state of a dynamic system at t,
dxi(t) = fi(x, U, t)dt + σi(t)dWi(t) + dPi(t), xi(0) = x0.
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where U(t) = (u1(t), ..., ui−1(t), ui(t), ui+1(t), ..., uN(t)), x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xi−1(t), xi(t),
xi+1(t), ..., xN(t)), f(x, U, t) = (f1(x, U, t), ..., fi−1(x, U, t)), fi(x, U, t), fi+1(x, U, t)
, ..., fN(x, U, t)), Wi(t) is a Brownian motion. dPi(t) is a mark-time Poisson process
whose rate is λJi(x, u, t) and whose jump amplitude probability density is ηi(z). When
the system is in state (t, x(t)) and the players select their controls u1(t), ..., uN(t),
player i receives the payoff rate gi(x, U, t).
The objective function is,
V ∗i (x, t) = max
ui











where r is the discount coefficient.
Definition 2.4.2 Nash Eequilibrium: when player i expects the other N − 1 players
to select their Nash equilibrium strategy. Formally, an N-tuple (u∗1(t), · · ·, u∗N(t)) of
strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Vi(u
∗
1(t), · · ·, u∗i (t), · · ·, u∗N(t)) ≥ Vi(u∗1(t), · · ·, u∗i−1(t), ui(t), u∗i+1(t), · · ·, u∗N(t))
We also define
u∗(t) = (u∗1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗i−1(x(t)), u∗i (x(t)), u∗i+1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗N(x(t))).
Theorem 2.4.1 Suppose that N-tupe (u1, · · ·, uN)of functions u∗i : [0, T ] is given, and
(i) there is a x(t) ∈ X of the initial value problem
dxi(t) = fi(x(t), ui(x(t))dt + σi(t)dWi(t) + dPi(t)
(ii) there exists a continuously differentiable function Vi : [0, T ] × X −→ R, such
that the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations are satisfied for all (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]×X:
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t



















∂2V ∗i (x, t)
∂x2












and where e = (e1, e2, ..., eN) is the (1×N) indicating vector, σi,j(t) is the covariance
of xi and xj, and furthermore nw and np are the number of Brownian motions and
Poisson processes, respectively, λJk is the rate of the kth mark-time Poisson process,
ηk(z) is the probability density of jump amplitude z of the kth mark-time Poisson
process, and Q is the domain of z.
(iii) the boundary conditions
Vi(T, x) = U(xi(T )))
are satisfied for all x ∈ X and i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
If u∗i (x(t)) is a maximizer of the right-hand side of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation, then u∗i (x(t)) is the Nash equilibrium solution, where σ is the volatility
matrix with dimension (N ×N).
Proof. If there are two solutions ui(t) and u
∗
i (t)(optimal solution), and their
trajectories are x(t) and x∗(t), respectively.
u(t) = (u∗1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗i−1(x(t)), ui(x(t)), u∗i+1(x(t)), · · ·, u∗N(x(t)))
The u∗i (t) is the maximizer because it is assumed as the optimal solution.
∂Vi(x, t)
∂t
























(V (x + ez, t)− V (x, t))ηk(z)dz
}
and
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t
+ Hi(x, t) = rV
∗
i (x, t) (2.4.3)
from equation (2.4.2) and (2.4.3),
∫ T
0







∗, u∗i , t)dt + V
∗
i (x








∗, u∗i , t)dt + V
∗
i (x
∗(T ), T ) ≥
∫ T
0
gi(x, ui, t)dt + Vi(x(T ), T )
The following is to validate the Hi by the principle of optimality.




gi(x, u, t)dt +
1
1 + rdt
V ∗i (x, t + dt)
∣∣∣∣x(t) = x, u(t) = u}




gi(x, u, t)(1 + rdt)dt + V
∗
i (x, t + dt)
∣∣∣∣x(t) = x, u(t) = u}




gi(x, u, t)(1 + rdt)dt + V
∗
i (x, t) +




∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂x
(



















(1 + rdt)V ∗i (x, t) = max
ui
{
gi(x, u, t)(1 + rdt)dt + V
∗
i (x, t) +
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t
dt +



















rV ∗i (x, t) = max
ui
{








∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂x





















gi(x, u, t) +
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t
+
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂x

















rV ∗i (x, t) = max
ui
{
∂V ∗i (x, t)
∂t
+ gi(x, u, t) +
∂V ∗i
∂x

















u = {u∗1, ..., u∗i−1, ui, u∗i+1, ..., u∗N}
(2.4.4)

The equation above can be solved using the Markov chain approximation method
when np = 1. h = (h1, h2, ..., hN) is the step length in the x direction. e =
(e1, e2, ..., eN) is the (1×N) indicating vector. fjk = fj(x, U, tk), σjk = σj(tk).






















V ∗i (x + ez, t)− V ∗i (x, t)
]













i , tk)∆tkJj + pk(x, x|u∗i )V ∗i (x, tk)+∑
j
(
pk(xj, xj + hj|u∗i )V ∗i (x + ejh, tk) + pk(xj, xj − hj|u∗i )V ∗i (x− ejh, tk)
)}
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Transition probability at time k from state xi, to xi, xi − hi, and xi + hi are
















), [fik]+ = max{+fik, 0}



















The above model is a Markov decision process model. The state variable is xi. ui
is a decision variable, k is a stage variable (time), V ∗i (x, tk−1) is the optimal return
function of player i at stage k.
From the Markov decision process framework, the complexity of the method is
O(ÑD̃T̃ ) from the Markov property, where T̃ is the number of the stage. Ñ is the
number of states in each stage and D̃ is the number of decisions in each stage.
A Markov decision process has the contraction mapping property in terms of a
value function. For example, if there are two value functions that will go thorough
the Markov decision process one time, then we have
||Γ̃W − Γ̃V || ≤ α̃||W − V ||
and the ||W || = maxS|W (S)|, 0 ≤ α̃ ≤ 1, Γ̃ is the value iteration operator of a MDP.
Moreover, the difference of the two value functions after the nth iterations in the two
functions satisfies the bound





So, the total calculations giving ε̃ is O(NDln(ε̃ ∗ (1− α̃)/(|V1 − V0| ∗ α̃)).
When T → ∞, the above model becomes an infinite horizon model. We use the
infinite horizon model in all examples in this chapter.
Theorem 2.4.2 In the infinite horizon case, the objective function is







































































































































(V ∗(x + ez)− V ∗(x))ηk(z)dz
}

We use the results in our examples in this chapter. We develop three examples
about stochastic optimal control market share with jump events and without jump
events. All examples are infinite horizon cases.
2.4.1 Properties of Nash Equilibrium Optimal Solution
We discuss the properties of the Nash equilibrium solution. The system is:
max
u





dx(t) = A(t)dt + σ(t)dW (t) + dP (t)











The model definition follows that of Esogbue et al. (2006). V (u) = (V1(u), V2(u), ..., VN(u))
is a vector with dimension m, G(x, u, t) = (g1(x, u, t), g2(x, u, t), ..., gN(x, u, t)) for
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N ≥ 2, and Gi(., ., .) are assumed to be continuously differentiable concave functions
of x and u. x(t) = (x1(t), ...xi−1(t), xi(t), xi+1(t), ..., xm(t)), dW (t) = (dW1(t), dW2(t), ...,
dWN(t)), dP (t) = (dP1(t), dP2(t), ..., dPN(t)). dPi(t) is the mark-time Poisson process
with the measure E[Pi(dt, dz)] = λJidtη(z)dz,
Theorem 2.4.3 Let u∗(t) be an admissible solution (control): then u∗(t) is not
a Nash equilibrium optimal solution if there exists a piecewise continuous function























Sufficiency: Suppose there exists a piecewise continuous function du(t) ∈ RN such
that the functional inequality holds. Let u(t) = u∗(t) + du(t). Then,
V (u)− V (u∗) = E
∫ t
0
[G(x, u, t)−G(x∗, u∗, t)]dt (2.4.9)
where x∗(t) is the state vector of system (2.4.7) when u(t) = u∗(t). Expanding
the integrand in (2.4.9), ∀t ∈ [0, tf ] with the Itô lemma , then leads to the following:







































V (u)− V (u∗) = E
∫ tf
0





















































































Theorem 2.4.4 Let u∗(t) be an admissible solution (control); then u∗(t) is not a
Nash equilibrium optimal solution only if there exists a piecewise continuous function






















[G(x, u, t)−G(x∗, u∗, t)]dt > 0







































A(t)dt + σ(t)dW (t)
)






















2.5 A Stochastic Differential-Jump Game Model for Brand
Competition
A SDJG is used to model the brand competition problem. The Sethi and Lanch-
ester framework is extended by additional jump events. The amplitudes of jumps
are considered a uniform distributed and a normally distributed random variable,
respectively.
In this section, we consider the “two companies” case. On the theoretical side,
there is no question for this model to handle an N-player situation. However, multi-
player games drive massive computations that make it very hard to solve these N-
player problems when N is a very large case, for example, N > 100.
For two companies, we assume the summation of market share is equal to one, i.e.,
x(t) + y(t) = 1 by the normalization (Erickson (1995a, 1995b) and Prasad and Sethi
(2004)). This equation assumes the total market share is constant. This assumption
is a common condition and accepted by default. It is also the feature of a game model.
This equation means the objective of competitors are conflict. When the market share
of one company is increased, the market share of the other is decreased. A brand’s
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market share depends not only on advertising, but also on price and the characteristics
of the brand. The quality of products is fixed after they are manufactured. We
consider only the advertising effort u(t) as our control input variable, where u(t) =
(u1(t), u2(t)).




















x(t)]dt + σ1(t)dW (t) + dP (t)





exp(β10 + u1(t)β1) + exp(β20 + u2(t)β2)
ρ2 =
exp(β20 + u2(t)β2)
exp(β10 + u1(t)β1) + exp(β20 + u2(t)β2)
(2.5.1)
where x(t) and y(t) are the sales rates (expressed as a fraction of the total mar-
ket) at time t; u1(t), u2(t) are advertising expenditure rates (efforts); r is the discount
coefficient; and m1, m2, c2, c2 are profit coefficients and cost coefficients, respectively.
ρ1, ρ2 are the response coefficients. δ is the coefficients of market share decay.
Based on Gihman and Skorohod (1972), as long as ui(x) and σ(x) satisfy the
Lipschitz conditions, and
σ(x) > 0, x ∈ (0, 1), σ(0) = σ(1) = 0, and dP (t) = 0 at x = 1
x is almost surely ∈ (0, 1) because the drift is strictly positive at x = 0, and drift is
strictly negative at x = 1.
ρ1
√
1− 0 > 0, and − ρ2 < 0
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The HJB equation for each company is



















1 (x + z)− V ∗1 (x))η(z)
}
rV ∗2 (y) = max
u2
{
















2 (x + z)− V ∗2 (x))η(z)
}
(2.5.2)
Here, x is x(t) for simplification. We set
g1(x, u) = m1x− c1u21, g2(x, u) = m2(1− x)− c2u22





After applying finite difference method, we get one Markov chain.
V ∗1 (x) = max
u1
{∑
p(x, x± h|u1)V ∗1 (x± h) + g1(x, u)4t + J14t
}
p(x, x± h|u1) =
σ21(t)/2 + hf
±(x, u)
σ21(t) + h|f(x, u)|+ rh2
4t = h
2










V ∗2 (x) = max
u2
{∑
p(x, x± h|u2)V ∗2 (x± h) + g2(x, u)4t + J24t
}
p(x, x± h|u2) =
σ21(t)/2 + hf
±(x, u)
σ21(t) + h|f(x, u)|+ rh2
4t = h
2






V ∗2 (x + z)− V ∗2 (x)
]
η(z)dz
where np = 1, nw = 1, np and nw are the number of Poisson processes and Brow-
nian motion processes, respectively. λJ is the rate of a jump process. z is the jump
value, and h is the direction or step coefficient. Q is the jump amplitude domain.
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η(z) is the probability density of z.
Let us analyze the structure of this model. By applying the first order condition
in the HJB equation (2.5.2), we have two equations:



























β1 exp(β10 + u1β1 + β20 + u2β2)(





β2 exp(β20 + u2β2)(





β1 exp(β10 + u1β1(





β2 exp(β10 + u1β1 + β20 + u2β2)(
exp(β10 + u1β1) + exp(β20 + u2β2)
)2
(2.5.4)
Following Sethi (1983), we assume
V1(x) = a1 + b1x, V2(x) = a2 + b2(1− x) (2.5.5)






This is the meaning of a non-cooperative game. Basically, the effort of each player is
in the opposite direction. The effort of player A will only benefit himself.
2.6 Numerical Examples
In this section, we present a number of examples to study the optimal control of mar-
ket share with jump events and without jump events. Example one is a stochastic
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differential game. The other examples are stochastic differential-jump games.
Example one (Figure 2) is about a stochastic differential game model for brand
competition. The system model is




















x(t)]dt + 0.2dW (t)











exp(βi0 + ui(t)βi) = exp(20u1(t) + 10) + exp(30u2(t) + 20). For instance,
Figure (2) shows the profits and advertising efforts of companies A and B. In the
following examples, the structure of figures follows the same sequence: profit, policy
(advertising effort). In Figure (2), we know that the max profit of company A is 43,
which is achieved when its market share is 0.92. When the market share of company
A is 0.2, company A needs to increase its advertising effort from 0.01 to 0.4. When
the market share of company A is 0.92, company A should decrease its advertising
effort from 0.4 to 0.01.
The max profit of company B is 89.5, which is achieved at 0.82 of the whole mar-
ket share. The advertising effort of company B is 0.02 except at the interval [0.8, 1.0].
The max advertising effort is around 0.14.
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Figure 2: Stochastic differential game example: profits and efforts of companies.
Example two (Figure 3) is a stochastic deferential jump game. The system model
is




















x(t)]dt + 0.2dW (t) + dP (t)







λJ = (1 + sin(t ∗ 0.5))/10, the amplitude is a truncated normal random variable
Norm(0.04, 0.01) in [-0.05,0.05].
In Figure (3), we know that the max profit of company A is 43, which is achieved
when its market share reaches 0.92. When the market share of company A is 0.2,
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company A needs to increase its advertising effort from 0.01 to 0.4. When the market
share of company A is 0.92, company A should decrease its advertising effort from
0.4 to 0.01. There are oscillations between [0.8, 1.0].
The max profit of company B is 149, which is achieved when its the market share
is 0.82. The advertising effort of company B is 0.02 except at the interval [0.8, 1.0].
The max advertisement effort is around 0.14.
We see that company A does not get the profit from the jump events. It seems
that the jumps are too small for company A. But company B is sensitive to these
jump events and gets the benefit of attracting customers from the increased market
share of company A.
Figure 3: Profits and policy of companies A and B with normally distributed jump
amplitude.
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Example three (Figure 4) is a SDJG with uniformly distributed jump amplitude.
The system model is




















x(t)]dt + 0.2dW (t) + dP (t)







the λJ = (1 + sin(t ∗ 0.5))/10, the amplitude is a uniform random variable unif[-
0.05, 0.05].
In Figure (4), we know that the max profit of company A is 60, which is achieved
at market share 0.92. The advertising effort of company A is 0.4 except at the interval
[0.8, 1.0]. The max advertising effort is around 0.45.
The max profit of company B is 149, which is achieved at market share 0.82. The
advertising effort of company B is 0.02 except at the interval [0.8, 1.0]. The max
advertising effort is around 0.14.
We see companies A and B do get the profit from the jump events at this time.
2.7 Discussion
We explore a stochastic dynamic duopoly game with jump events. We consider the
feedback Markov solution. The solution satisfying HJB is the Nash equilibrium solu-
tion because we assume other players also use the Nash equilibrium soluation.
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Figure 4: Profits and policy of companies A and B with uniformly distributed jump
amplitude.
Our stochastic differential-jump game model extends the ability of the stochas-
tic differential game model when there are jump disturbances in the market. The
game model is developed from a static game model (mathematical programming) to
a dynamic game model, namely, the differential game model that introduces the state
evolution along time t. From a differential game model to a stochastic differential
game model, the stochastic component, a Brownian motion is added to the state dy-
namic equation. In order to model the jumps/discrete events, the mark-time Poisson
process is added in SDJG.
The state dynamic equation is extended by introducing jump events. The state
dynamics are located between [0,1] by the absorbing boundary and reflective bound-
ary condition. The HJB equation is also changed by adding an integration of the
value function.
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The Markov chain approximation method is preferred because of its good conver-
gence properties. The method is developed from the finite difference method with a
different way, namely, Markov decision process.
The numerical study shows some results of jump effects on optimal policies. The
difficulty of computation originates from the curse of dimensionality of dynamic pro-
gramming. Probably, the approximate dynamic programming method (Powell 2007)
can reduce the computational burden.
In this chapter, we have defined and developed a new concept, a stochastic
differential-jump game. This model enhances our ability to handle discrete state
changes. Because not all system states can be modeled as continuous variables, this
model may be useful, especially in marketing competition, when there is a powerful
entrant to a balanced market. Our model follows the Sethi and Lanchester frame-
work. The basic difference is that mark-time Poisson processes are added into state
equations. Several examples in different situations were tested. To the best of our
knowledge, these examples are the first applications of a stochastic differential-jump
game model in market competition studies.
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CHAPTER III
ROBUST HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN LOGIT/PROBIT
MODEL IN ANALYSIS OF MARKET HETEROGENEITY
Each customer is different, having a different age, income, education level, and culture
characteristics that create heterogeneity. A hierarchical model is a suitable method
for modeling heterogeneity. This type of model is used to provide a method to scruti-
nize detailed elements of a problem and provide a heterogeneity model (coefficients)
for different customers.
A hierarchical model can combine the features of products with the characteris-
tics of customers. The Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methodology
makes the Bayesian technique more practical. MCMC has some advantages com-
pared to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) because MCMC realizes and draws
inferences from those parameters samples.
Logit and probit models are simple and well-known statistical models. A hierar-
chical probit or logit model is a multi-level model in which the top level is the probit
or logit, and the bottom level is a multilevel regression model. A robust hierarchical
Bayesian logit/probit model is discussed in this chapter. Robustness also means that
the model works very well with extreme outlier data because the long tail t distribu-
tion is used. Robustness makes estimation of those parameters more stable than that
of a general maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method.
This chapter includes (1) a robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model and
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(2) an experiment to validate the proposed robust model using a bank credit card
choice data.
3.1 Introduction
Market heterogeneity is a phenomenon that is related to customer segmentation and
target market selection. Simply, heterogeneity describes the difference among cus-
tomers (Allenby et al. (1999)). Each customer has his/her own parameters even
though we use the same model structure. Heterogeneity comes from demography,
national culture, preferences, loyalties, etc. It is also related to the methods and
processes by which a customer makes choices.
Logit and probit are well-known statistical models, but single-level logit and pro-
bit models have limited ability to deal with heterogeneity. A hierarchical model is
a method that matches the classification or categorization process used by a human
being. The advantage of this type of model is that it provides a method for scruti-
nizing detailed elements of a problem and provides different coefficients for different
customers. A hierarchical model combines features of products with the characteris-
tics of customers.
The MCMC methodology is a powerful computation technique for Bayesian anal-
ysis. There is an integral in the computation of a Bayesian posterior distribution that
is difficult to compute. MCMC solves this problem and makes the Bayesian technique
more practical.
There are two types of robust regression: the least squares error alternative and the
parameter alternative. Huber introduced maximum likelihood type “M-estimation”
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for regression in 1973. This is a least squares alternative. Lange, Little, and Taylor
(1989) introduced the parameters method, which is used in this chapter. The error
is assumed to be a t distribution because t has a long tail to cover the outliers. Con-
versely, a normal distribution usually has a shrinkage effect. Because of the long tail,
a t distribution can include some outlier data. The robust linear regression estimator
assigns a different weight for each observation (sample) according to its estimated
error.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section (3.2) introduces
several types of heterogeneity; argues why a hierarchical model is better for model-
ing heterogeneity; Section (3.3) discusses hierarchical model; Section (3.4) introduces
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation and its advantages; Section (3.5) reviews
hierarchical Bayesian models for heterogeneity; Section (3.6) designs the robust hier-
archical logit/probit model; Section (3.8) describes these experiments, and validation
of our models.
3.2 Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity describes the differences among customers in a market. In the Merriam-
Webster dictionary, the meaning of heterogeneity is the status of consisting of dissim-
ilar or diverse ingredients or constituents. Researchers have studied several types of
first level models with a regression at a lower level, for example, a first level normal
linear regression model (Blattberg and George (1991)), a first level logit model (Al-
lenby and Ginter (1995)), a first level probit model (McCulloch and Rossi (1994)),
a first level Poisson model (Neelamegham and Chintagunta (1999)), and a first level
generalized gamma distribution model (Allenby, Leone, and Jen (1999)). These mod-
els point out that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity across units in various
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marketing data sets. Customer segmentation is also related to heterogeneity. For
example, the price coefficient could be different for each group of customers because
wealthier people are usually less price conscious. Common heterogeneity factors are
reviewed below.
1) Brand loyality/pereference heterogeneity. Some customers are loyal to
a specific brand. Preference segmentation is a widely researched issue in recent lit-
erature. For example, some customers have strong firm or country-origin loyalty in
the auto market. There are two main methods to deal with this kind of hetero-
geneity. One method is to treat preference segmentation as an exogenous variable;
the other is to treat preference segmentation as an unobserved variable distributed
among different customers (which is thought to ignore heterogeneity in this method).
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988) treated preference heterogeneity as an average, and
Guadagni and Little (1983) used exponential smoothing of past choices. Kamakura
et al. (1991) used a continuous distribution with a random effects method. Jones and
Landewehr (1988), Rossi and Allenby (1993), and Heckman and Singer (1984) used
a discrete distributed or household-specific fixed effect.
2) Price heterogeneity. Some groups of customers are sensitive to price change.
For instance, households with many children usually prefers a low price because they
need a larger quantity of a particular product. The poor have greater budget (liquid-
ity) constraints and may consequently buy products in small quantity, which results
in higher per-unit retail prices. The groups with low incomes face higher retail prices
than rich groups, particularly in developing countries (Rao (2000)).
3) Structural heterogeneity. Structural heterogeneity addresses the difference
of a customer’s choice processes. Different customers use different decision or choice
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processes. This situation is under-researched compared to the preference segment. A
common method for studying structural heterogeneity is a nested logit model. Cur-
rim et al. (1988) used nonparametric classifications. Kannan and Wright (1991)
combined several nested logit models.
4) Demographic heterogeneity. Customers with the same demographic vari-
ables such as income, number of children, and age are grouped into the same segment.
This research has been applied to retailer site choice (Ghosh and McLafferty (1987)),
transportation method (Hauser, Koppelman, and Tybout (1981)), and market seg-
mentation (Allenby and Rossi (1991)).
5) Scale heterogeneity. In survey research, survey practitioners have long no-
ticed that respondents vary in their usage of scales: different patterns include using
the middle of the scale or using the upper or lower bounds. Because there are large
cultural or cross-country differences in scale usage, it is difficult to combine data
across cultural or international boundaries. This different usage of scales, termed as
“scale usage heterogeneity,” imparts bias in many of the standard analyses conducted
with survey data. The standard procedure for dealing with scale usage heterogeneity
is to normalize data.
6) Spatial heterogeneity. The identification of geographic target markets is
critical to the success of companies that are expanding internationally. The customer
choice process depends on differences in cultures and nations. Country borders have
traditionally been used to delineate such target markets. This is a “countries-as-
segments” approach, even though there is an accelerating trend toward global market
convergence. Researchers such as Sethi (1971), Helsen et al. (1993), and Kale (1995)
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have used “country segmentation.” Some researchers have proposed using “cross-
national segmentation” where country borders are ignored and consumers in different
countries are grouped into cross-national segments, based on their similarities in needs
(Kamakura et al. (1993), Yavas et al. (1992)).






where xi = (xi1, ..., xik)
′ are the choice attributes, and βi = (βi1, ..., βik)
′ are the
parameters associated with these choice attributes. If coefficients βî are the same
for each customer, the logit model is a homogenous model. If coefficients βi are dif-
ferent for each customer, the logit model is a heterogenous model (Jones et al. (1988)).
The formal argument is why heterogeneous models work better than homoge-
neous models. Assume that we use a heterogeneous design so that respondent î is
given the parameters βî, for î = 1, ..., N, and the full parameters consist of the col-
lection of subparameters β = βî; î = 1, ..., N . Here, each respondent would have his
or her own parameters. We obtain the optimal heterogeneous model by maximizing
Likelihood(β) over the N subparameters. The optimization problem can be formally
represented as follows:
max Likelihood(β1, β2, ...., βN)
Note that we obtain the homogeneous model by maximizing Likelihood(β) with
respect to β, which is the same as maximizing Likelihood(β1, ..., βN) with respect to
β1, ..., βN under the restriction that β1 = β2, · · ·, = βN . So, the homogenous model is
a constrained optimization problem. A heterogenous model is an unconstrained opti-
mal problem compared with a homogenous model. Thus the result of a heterogenous
model is better than that of a homogenous model.
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3.3 Hierarchical Model
A hierarchical model is a multi-level model that fits the nature of classified and cate-
gorized data. It is very suitable for modeling market heterogeneity. Many marketing
data sets have a hierarchical or cluster structure. For example, we first observe the
choice data, “0” or “1” for a brand. Then we look for why the customer chose this
brand. Is the choice because of a specific customer or because of a specific brand?
Before using the hierarchical model, an alternative approach for heterogeneity is
to specify a random effects model. Examples include Heckman and Singer (1984),
Kamakura and Russell (1989), Chintagunta et al. (1991), and Gonul and Srinivasan
(1993). In the random effects model, individual household level parameters are viewed
as draws from a super-population distribution, which is called the random effects or
a mixed distribution.
Hierarchy describes a model consisting of units grouped in different levels. In
these models, there are a few lower level units within each higher level unit. Espe-
cially in some complex cases, this kind of logit or probit model with a binary (0,1)
response is no longer adequate. Rodriguez and Goldman (1995) illustrated this hi-
erarchical model. Goldstein and Rasbash (1996) also described this multi-level model.
For example, the hierarchy is
Likelihood: p(yi|θi)
First-stage prior: p(θi|τ)
Second-stage prior: p(τ |xi)
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The yi, xi are the output and input information, respectively. θi, τ are the param-
eters of the hierarchical model.
The joint posterior for the hierarchical model is given by
p(θ1, ..., θm, τ |y1, ..., ym, x1, ..., xm) ∝ Πmi=1p(yi|θi)p(θi|τ)p(τ |xi).
In a hierarchical model, the prior induced on the unit-level parameters is not an
independent prior. The unit-level parameters are conditionally independent :
p(θ1, θ2, ...θm|x1, ..., xm) =
∫
Πip(θi|τ)p(τ |xi)dτ
In the sequel, we present an overview of a three-level logit model: A three-level
logit model is a two-level logit model with a lower level regression for each βi, the
parameter associates with choice attributes.
First level: Here, observation yîi indicates if brand i is chosen. yîi is a Bernoulli
random variable with success probability yîi|pîi, yîi = 1 with probability pîi. yîi = 1
means brand i is chosen by the respondent î. yîi = 0 means the brand i is not chosen
by the respondent î.
Second level: It is a logit model. xi = (xi1, ..., xik)
′ are the choice attributes, and
βî = (βî1, ..., βîk)











where zî = (zî1, ..., zîm), ε ∼ Norm(0, σ2). The three-level probit model is a two-
level probit model with a regression or distribution for βî. The third level is a linear
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3.4 Markov Chain Monte Carlo
The general computational difficulty facing Bayesians is that various integrals of func-
tions with respect to the posterior distribution must be computed. Since these in-
tegrals can be written as the posterior expectation of a function of the parameters,
simulation methods seem natural for approximation. For example, if we could make
independent identically distributed (i.i.d) draws from the posterior, we could simply
approximate the integrals by the sample mean
I = Eθ|y[f(θ)] =
∫





where N̄ is the number of sampling, and θ is the parameter that f bases on. In-
stead of using i.i.d. draws, another approach could be to construct a Markov chain
with the posterior as its equilibrium distribution. In practice, this means specifying
a transition density that produces a sequence of θ draws. θi is a draw from p(θi|θi−1)
given θi−1.
MCMC has some advantages in computation: (1) MCMC has the ability to han-
dle many different types of variables, and inferences are valid for all parameters; (2)
missing responses are treated in a right way and missing data can be drawn and
replaced from the posterior distribution; and (3) hierarchical models are naturally
implemented by MCMC; many types of data used in marketing research are gener-
ated by a hierarchical process.
The MCMC method is very suitable for developing a hierarchical model. The
hierarchical structure of panel data is ideally suited for the MCMC method. There
are two well-known algorithms to implement a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
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simulation: the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Metropolis et al. (1953)) and the
Gibbs sampler algorithm (Geman et al. (1984)).
Robust regression estimation has recently attracted much attention, but the gen-
eral usage of regression is not a robust estimator because the error distribution is as-
sumed to be a normal distribution. Actually, maximum likelihood estimators (MLE)
are very sensitive to the assumptions of the statistical model. For instance, consider
the assumption that the sample mean and variance are truly normally distributed.
If the assumption is true for sample data, then the sample mean and variance are
correctly estimated. However, these estimators will change significantly when there
are outliers. Because these estimators are the average of the data and the squared
deviations from the mean, respectively, a single outlier may drive the sample mean
and variance to an erroneous value when it is far enough removed from other data.
Actually, extreme outliers are nearly impossible to be fitted with an exactly normal
distribution. We usually approximate the data by a t distribution with heavier tails
instead of a normal distribution.
3.5 Review of Previous Models
In the marketing science literature, there are nested logit models, mixture normal
models, hierarchical models, and structural models. Here, we review some hierarchi-
cal models that relate to our work.
Hierarchical Model. A hierarchical logit model is given by McCulloch and Rossi
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(1994).







βî + εîj, εî ∼ Norm(0, σ
2),
βî = ∆
′zî + vî, vî ∼ Norm(0, Vβ).
Here, Ỹîj = 1 when brand j is chosen. yîj is the latent variable. zî is a vector of
variables that explain heterogeneity as cross-unit differences. Typically, we use those
various demographic or market characteristics that connect differences in brand pref-
erence or marketing sensitivities.
Allenby and Ginter (1995) gave another hierarchical model :







(α + βî) + εîj,
βî = Γzî + ζî .
where
yîj : the latent variable of profile j evaluated by the respondent î,
xîj : vector of independent variables associated with profile j for respondent î,
α : fixed-effects coefficient that are assumed constant across respondents,
βî : respondent-specific coefficients that modify α,
εîj : i.i.d norm error term Norm(0, σ
2),
ζî: i.i.d Norm(0, D),
Γ : a matrix of coefficients that relates βî the value of zî,
zî : the vector of variables that account for observed heterogeneity.
Yang and Allenby (2003) proposed an autoregression model to reflect the possible
interdependent effects of each customer because of social relationship and information
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networks:
P (Ỹi = 1) = P (yi > 0),
yi = x
′
iβ + εi + θi,
θ = ρWθ + µ,
ε = Norm(0, Ī),
µ ∼ Norm(0, σ2).
where ρW is a matrix that specifies the interdependence network, which is a coeffi-
cient that measures the influence of the network. θ = (θ1, ..., θk) are the autoregression
parameters.
Mixture Normal Model. The elemental block of a mixture of normal extensions
of the prior pdf is the normal model. A mixture of normal models (Rossi et al. 2005)
can be written as
p(θ|θ1, ...θk, V1, ..., Vk) = r1φ(θ|θ1, V1) + r2φ(θ|θ2, V2)+, ...., +rkφ(θ|θk, Vk),∑
i
ri = 1.
The mixture of normal models provides a great deal of flexibility for pdf approxima-
tion, especially for the long tail distribution.
Nested Logit Model. Moore and Lehmann (1989) and Jeffrey (1986) used those
nested multinomial logit models. McFadden (1986), Ben-Arkiva and Lerman (1985)











the 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1 is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility
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among alternatives in nest k. Bk represents subset, namely, nest k.
3.6 Bayesian Robust Regression
Robust statistics can work well to give useful results even though a certain specified
model assumption is incorrect or when the assumed model error distribution is inap-
propriate. This class of statistics is useful when outliers (observations far from the
bulk of the data) are present, for example, if error distribution has heavier tails such
as a t distribution, Cauchy, or Double exponential distribution.
3.6.1 Some Important Probability Distributions
Before we talk about the robust hierarchical probit and logit models, we review some
important probability distributions used in the robust regression.
(1) t distribution: Let Z be a Norm(0, 1) and χ2(ν) be a chi-square variable with



















Γ̂(n) = n! .






x(ν/2)−1e−x/2, x > 0.




(λx)r−1e−λx, x > 0.
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The Gamma distribution Gamma(ν/2, ν/2) and χ2(ν)/ν have the same probabil-
ity density function.
Proof.




The probability density function of χ2(ν)/ν, assumes y ∼ χ2(ν), x = y/ν, so the the













3.6.2 Bayesian Point Estimation
Lange, Little, and Taylor (1989) provided a robust parameter estimation in a regres-






where β = (β1, ..., βk)
′
is a vector of unknown parameters, w = diag(w1, ..., wn)
′
is
a vector of unknown parameters, n is the number of observation, and σ is also an
unknown parameter. N is a normal random variable. It is sometimes more useful to
write this model as
yi = x
′
iβ + εi, εi ∼ Norm(0, σ2/wi), (i = 1, ..., n).
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or in vector formation.
y = Xβ + ε, var(ε) = σ2/w, w = diag(w1, ..., wn).
The likelihood function of this model is :













If the prior probability density function is π(β, σ) = σ−1 and wi is Gamma(ν/2, ν/2),
then










So the likelihood function for the Bayesian posterior density kernel is














3.6.3 Posterior Density Distribution of β and σ
(a) First, we consider the multiple regression case. As the posterior density of β, σ





















































































and the prior distribution of β is Norm(β̄, A),









ns2 = (y −Xβ̃)′(y −Xβ̃) + (β̃ − β̄)′A(β̃ − β̄),
β̃ = (X
′
X + A)−1(Xy + Aβ̄).
n is the observation number. w = diag{w1, ..., wn}, β = {β1, ..., βn}, and x =
{x1, ..., xn}.
(b) In the multivariate regression case
Ȳj = X̄jB + Norm(0, Σ/wj)
the dimensions of Ȳ , X̄ are (n×m), (n×k), Ȳ = (Ȳ1, ..., Ȳj, ..., Ȳn)′, Ȳj = (ȳj1, ..., ȳjm),
X̄ = (X̄1, ..., X̄j, ..., X̄n)





wj + Norm(0, Σ)
We set Ȳj
√
wj = Yj, X̄j
√





















Assume the B and Σ prior distribution is







where ν0, m, and V0 are the prior parameters. |Σ| is the determinant of Σ. By the
optimal least squares estimation, we have
B̂ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y.
The posterior distribution has three levels. The following are the exact results of
Rossi et al. (2005).














































(B − B̃)′(X ′X + A)(B − B̃)Σ−1)
]
where
B̃ = (X ′X + A)−1(X ′XB̂ + AB̄),
S = (Y −XB̃)′(Y −XB̃) + (B̃ − B̄)′A(B̃ − B̄).
where B̄ is the prior estimated parameter and A is the variance matrix of B condi-
tional on Σ. trA =
∑n
i aii is the trace of a square n×n matrix A. m is the dimension
of Σ, k is the dimension of B, and n is the number of observations of Y .
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The posterior distribution of Σ matches the result of Anderson (1994). If A has
the Wishart distribution W (Σ, n) and Σ has the a priori inverse Wishart distribution
IW (Ψ, m), then the conditional distribution of Σ is IW (A + Ψ, n + m).
3.6.4 Posterior Density Distribution of w and ν
The posterior distribution of w is conditional on β and σ; the conditional posterior
density of wi is proportional to
w
(ν−3)/2
i exp[−(σ−2(yi − βixi)2 + ν)wi/2].
So, by Geweke (1993),
(σ−2(yi − βixi)2 + ν)wi|(β, σ) ∼ χ2(ν + 1)
Since the Gamma distribution is the conjugate prior distribution,









The distribution of freedom ν was discussed by Geweke (1993) and Liu (1995).
The following are some theoretical results used in hierarchical models.
3.6.5 Two Level Regressions
The following theories are the result of Bayesian analysis for a hierarchical regression
model.
Theorem 3.6.1 (Lindley and Smith (1972)) Given θ1,
y ∼ Norm(A1θ1, C1)
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and given θ2
θ1 ∼ Norm(A2θ2, C2),
then the distribution of y is
y ∼ Norm(A1A2θ2, C1 + A1C2A
′
1).





1 A1 + C
−1




1 y + C
−1
2 A2θ2.









βî = Γzî + ξî, βî ∼ Norm(Γzî, ξî).
Draw βî, î = 1, ...,M(one respondent at a time)
βî|{x, y, Z, Γ, σ




Using the above theorem and setting θ1 = βî, C1 = σ
2, A1 = xîj, and θ2 = Γ,






























3.7 Robust Hierarchial Bayesian Logit/Probit Model
Lange, Little, and Taylor (1989) gave a robust parameter estimation in a regression
using a t distribution. In the newly developed model, a t distribution is used in the
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bottom level of the hierarchical logit/probit model.
βi ∼ t(Γzi, Σ, ν)
First level: observation yîi is modeled as a Bernoulli random variable with success
probability: yîi|pîi, yîi = 1 with probability pîi.











The third level is a linear regression:
βî = Γzî + ε.
where ε is t(u, Σ, ν1) (Liu 1996). To estimate the t(u, Σ, ν1), a normal/independent
random variable T̄ = µ + V/
√
w is used, where V is the normal random variable
N(0, Σ). w is a positive independent random variable, which has a distribution






After reviewing the robust Bayesian estimation theory in the above section, we
merge this method with the hierarchical framework and call the resulting model a
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robust hierarchical model. We need to assume the prior distribution first:












βî = Γzî + ξî,
εîj ∼ N(0, σ
2),
ξî ∼ Norm(0, Σ/wî),
wî ∼ Gamma(ν1/2, ν1/2).
(3.7.1)
The following are definitions:
yîj : the latent variable of profile j evaluated by the respondent î;
xîj : vector of independent variables associated with profile j for respondent î;
βî : respondent i-specific coefficients, βî = (βî1, ..., βîk), k is the number of properties
of a profile;
εîj : i.i.d norm error term Norm(0, σ
2);
Γ : matrix of coefficients that relates βî to the value of zî;
zî : respondent’s information, is a (3, 1) dimension vector;
ξî : unobserved heterogeneity component;
wî : the weight, Gamma distribution with parameters ν1/2, ν1/2.
3.7.1 Gibbs Sampling
Then we draw each parameter using the Gibbs sampling method (Geman and Geman
(1984)) according to the posterior distribution mentioned above.
1. Draw βî, î = 1, ..., N(one respondent at a time).
βî|{x, y, Z, Γ, σ



































This is the regression result.




Γ|Z, β, Σ, w ∼ Norm(γ∗, G)
where
G = ((Z∗)′(I ⊗ (Σ/wî)
−1)Z∗))−1,
γ∗ = G((Z∗)′(I ⊗ (Σ/wî)
−1β),
Z∗ = (I ⊗ z1, ...., I ⊗ z3).
This is also from the regression result. ⊗ is the Kronecker product of two ma-
trixes. vecA = (a1, a2, ..., an)
′ is a vec operator of A. A is a (m × n) matrix, and its
j-th column is aj.
3. Draw w.
w|Z, {βî}, Γ, Σ, ν ∼ Gamma((ν1 + 1)/2, (ν1 + s)/2)
s = (β − ΓZ)Σ−1(β − ΓZ)′
4. Draw Σ.
Σ|β, Γ, w ∼ IW (d0 + N, D0 +
N∑
î=1
wî(βî − Γzî)(βî − Γzî)
′)
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where prior Σ ∼ IW (d0, D0), and N is the number of respondents.
5. Generate σ2.
σ2|y, x, {βî} ∼ Inverted χ










where prior σ2 ∼ Inverted χ2(s0, S0) and n is the number of the observation.
6. Draw y|n1, X, {βî}, σ2 by the Accept-Reject method. n1 is the number of 1’s.
3.7.2 Goodness-Fit Test
To test which model fits these data better, some rules are needed, such as the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and the log-
marginal density (LMD) criterion. AIC and BIC are general criteria for model selec-
tion, while LMD is usually used for Bayesian models, especially for the MCMC draw.
AIC is not always consistent with BIC.
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is defined below:
AIC = −2 log(L̂) + 2K,
where L̂ is the estimated likelihood function, and K is the number of free parameter
estimated.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is defined below.
BIC = −2 log(L̂) + K ln(N̄),
where N̄ is the sample number. We prefer the model with the smallest AIC or BIC.
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The LMD is frequently used in comparing Bayesian models. The model with the
highest log-marginal densities (LMD) is most supported by the data. We estimate
the LMD as the log of the mean of the likelihood values across iterations N̄ of the







We select the model with larger LMD. Some definitions used in the following
tables are listed.
a) RHlogit: Robust Hierarchical Logit,
b) RHProbit: Robust Hierarchical Probit,
c) wLMD: LMD is calculated with the likelihood of the whole hierarchical model
including the first level (logit/probit) and the second level of robust regression,
d) wAIC: AIC is calculated with the likelihood of the whole hierarchical model include
the first level (logit/probit) and the second level of the robust regression,
e) wBIC: BIC is calculated with the likelihood of the whole hierarchical model include
the first level (logit/probit) and the second level of the robust regression,
f) hLMD: LMD is calculated with the likelihood of the first level (logit/probit),
g) hAIC: AIC is calculated with the likelihood of the first level (logit/probit),
h) hBIC: BIC is calculated with the likelihood of the first level (logit/probit),
i) rLMD: LMD of the second level of the robust regression,
j)rAIC: AIC of the second level of the robust regression,
k) rBIC: BIC of the second level of the robust regression,
l) fe: The forecast error is computed with the 2838 observations.
3.8 Experiments
Data from Allenby et al. (1995) in which two partial profiles of credit cards are pre-
sented to 946 respondents and 14,799 observations are used in our experiment. Each
respondent was presented with between 13 and 17 paired comparisons. Thus, this
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data set has a panel structure. There are two data sets. One is the choice attribute;
the other is the demographic attribute. All results are based on the 20,000 MCMC
draws. The structure of the hierarchy is shown in Figure (5).
Figure 5: Hierarchical structure.
The outlier analysis, βî1, βî3, and zî are sampled for βî1 = αî1 + Γ11zî1 + Γ12zî2 +
Γ1,3zî3 + ζ(̂i,1) and βî3 = αî3 + Γ11zî1 + Γ13zî2 + Γ1,3zî3 + ζ(̂i,3), Figure (6) shows that
outliers do exist from the regression analysis. The data labeled by numbers are
assumed to be outliers.
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Figure 6: Outlier analysis of βî1, 2000 run.
If we run the simulation 20,000 times, the result will become better, but there are
still some outliers as shown in Figure (7). This is motivation for why we use the t
distribution.
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Figure 7: Outlier analysis of βî3, 20,000 run.
In the following likelihood function computation, we do not use the î because each
response from any respondent is one observation. There is no need to recognize the
response from which respondent. The likelihood function of the hierarchical model is








The likelihood in logit/probit level (top level) is




ijβi)) or prob = Φ(x
′
ijβi),









−0.5wk(βi − ziΓ)Σ−1(βi − (ziΓ))
′
.





−0.5wi(βi − ziΓ)Σ−1(βi − (ziΓ))
′
+ Lh.
The following tables and graphs show the results of experiments. It seems that the
robust hierarchical logit/probit model converges faster than the hierarchical logit/probit
model. We run MCMC 20,000 iterations and keep every 20th sample draw.
In the following tables, β(.,1) relates to the attribute of credit card, medium fixed
interest. β(.,2) relates to the attribute of low fixed interest, β(.,3) relates to the at-
tribute of medium variable interest, β(.,4) relates the attribute of reward program 2
, β(.,5) relates to the attribute of reward program 3, β(.,6) relates to the attribute of
reward program 4, β(.,7) relates to the attribute of medium annual fee, β(.,8) relates to
the attribute of low annual fee, β(.,9) relates to the attribute of bank b, β(.,10) relates
to the attribute of out-of-state bank, β(.,11) relates to the attribute of medium rebate,
β(.,12) relates to the attribute of high rebate, β(.,13) relates to the high credit line, β(.,14)
relates to the long grace period.
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3.8.1 Results of Hierarchical Bayesian Logit/Probit Models
Figures (8) and (9) show the MCMC draws of Γ and Σ of HB logit and HB probit.
The upper two graphs in each figure are the Γ draws, The bottom two graphs in each
figure are the Σ draws. Γ and Σ are defined in Section (3.7.1). The x axis is the
number of samples kept. Table (1) shows the mean of Γ, namely, E[Γ], the sample
variance of E[Γ], namely, V ar(E[Γ]), of the hierarchical Bayesian logit and probit
model. HB represents the hierarchical Bayesian. In these tables, we do not provide
some statistics tests such as t test and p value because those results are simulations.
MCMC converges to the expected stationary distribution of these parameters with a
very weak condition, namely, irreducible.
Table (2) shows the mean and variance of β of each model such as hierarchical
Bayesian logit (HB logit) and hierarchical Bayesian probit (HB probit)
Combining these parameters in Tables (1) and (2), we can analyze the marginal
effects of these demographic elements. For example, the increase of the long grace
period will decrease the probability of choice probability. An increase of the high
credit line will attract a selection of customers.
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Figure 8: MCMC draw of parameters in hierarchical Bayesian logit.
3.8.2 Results of Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Logit/Probit Model
The following tables and graphs show results of the robust hierarchical Bayesian
logit/probit model. Table (3) shows E[Γ] and V ar(E[Γ]) of the robust hierarchical
Bayesian logit/probit model. Table (4) shows β of each model such as a robust hi-
erarchical Bayesian logit (RHB logit), and robust hierarchical Bayesian probit (RHB
probit). Figures (10) and (11) show the MCMC draws of Γ and Σ of RHB logit and
RHB probit. The upper two graphs in each figure are the Γ draws; the bottom two
graphs in each figure are the Σ draws. Γ and Σ are defined in Section (3.7.1). The x
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Figure 9: MCMC draw of parameters in hierarchical Bayesian probit.
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Table 1: Mean [Γ] and Var[E(Γ)] of hierarchical Bayesian logit and probit.
E(Γ)
Attribute HB Probit HB Logit
β(., .) Intercept age income gender Intercept age income gender
medium fixed interest 1.699 -0.010 0.008 0.082 2.675 -0.016 0.012 0.181
low fixed interest 3.286 -0.016 0.0150 0.299 5.173 -0.0259 0.022 0.469
medium variable interest 2.145 -0.001 0.018 -0.244 3.403 -0.003 0.025 -0.380
reward program 2 -0.022 0.004 -0.00097 -0.206 -0.040 0.009 -0.001 -0.312
reward program 3 -0.370 0.017 0.007 -0.248 -0.578 0.029 0.011 -0.277
reward program 4 -0.346 0.018 0.008 -0.279 -0.555 0.031 0.013 -0.328
medium annual fee 1.395 -0.0008 0.002 0.395 2.213 -0.003 0.003 0.660
low annual fee 2.676 -0.0032 0.004 0.784 4.271 -0.007 0.007 1.376
bank b -0.250 -0.0008 0.002 0.096 -0.317 -0.002 0.002 0.129
out-of-state bank -2.416 -0.009 0.008 0.049 -3.289 -0.013 0.012 0.101
medium rebate 0.889 -0.004 0.003 0.145 1.438 -0.004 0.005 0.273
high rebate 1.575 -0.009 0.015 0.253 2.566 -0.012 0.025 0.513
high credit line 0.737 -0.006 -0.0008 0.260 1.164 -0.011 -0.0002 0.491
long grace period 2.293 -0.016 0.013 0.197 3.575 -0.024 0.019 0.226
Var[E(Γ)]
Attribute HB Probit HB Logit
β(., .) Intercept Age Income Gender Intercept Age Income Gender
medium fixed interest 6.881e-03 2.924e-05 1.292e-05 2.383e-02 1.274e-02 7.806e-05 2.526e-05 5.452e-02
low fixed interest 1.963e-02 6.805e-05 3.241e-05 6.015e-02 3.516e-02 2.147e-04 7.467e-05 1.606e-01
medium variable interest 1.993e-02 7.549e-05 3.698e-05 6.175e-02 4.153e-02 2.366e-04 7.057e-05 1.703e-01
reward program 2 3.591e-03 1.739e-05 7.752e-06 1.711e-02 1.486e-02 3.912e-05 1.358e-05 2.811e-02
reward program 3 1.018e-02 5.244e-05 1.965e-05 4.479e-02 4.019e-02 1.055e-04 5.695e-05 9.796e-02
reward program 4 1.516e-02 9.521e-05 3.845e-05 1.030e-01 9.087e-02 1.803e-04 8.621e-05 1.881e-01
medium annual fee 6.938e-03 3.313e-05 1.389e-05 2.562e-02 1.285e-02 9.699e-05 3.123e-05 7.298e-02
low annual fee 1.946e-02 1.014e-04 3.693e-05 6.747e-02 3.599e-02 2.301e-04 1.029e-04 2.421e-01
bank b 4.924e-03 2.221e-05 8.630e-06 2.346e-02 7.373e-03 5.632e-05 1.618e-05 4.814e-02
out-of-state bank 2.726e-02 1.132e-04 4.768e-05 9.270e-02 5.358e-02 2.657e-04 8.094e-05 1.826e-01
medium rebate 5.679e-03 2.534e-05 9.494e-06 1.779e-02 1.426e-02 3.915e-05 2.109e-05 2.797e-02
high rebate 1.660e-02 8.429e-05 3.248e-05 7.098e-02 3.192e-02 1.759e-04 8.001e-05 1.075e-01
high credit line 5.057e-03 3.170e-05 1.035e-05 3.079e-02 1.530e-02 7.572e-05 2.455e-05 6.710e-02
long grace period 7.556e-03 4.683e-05 1.988e-05 4.672e-02 3.051e-02 1.134e-04 3.486e-05 8.377e-02
Table 2: Comparison E[β]and Var[β] of hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit.
Attribute E[β] Var[β]
β(., .) HBlogit HBprobit HBlogit HBprobit
medium fixed interest 0.015 0.027 0.076 0.057
low fixed interest 0.991 1.133 1.630 1.938
medium variable interest 0.975 0.987 4.575 2.615
reward program 2 -0.813 -0.362 6.300 2.795
reward program 3 1.738 0.996 2.773 1.301
reward program 4 3.222 1.777 9.736 5.108
medium annual fee -0.380 -0.428 6.149 3.379
low annual fee 3.088 1.893 5.027 2.232
bank b 2.715 1.662 5.603 2.901
out-of-state bank 1.422 0.875 7.909 2.900
medium rebate -0.744 -0.348 3.637 1.806
high rebate 1.434 0.922 2.719 1.132
high credit line 3.042 1.920 12.913 4.838
long grace period -0.495 -0.496 5.351 3.162
HB logit: hierarchical bayesian logit model
HB probit:hierarchical bayesian probit model
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Figure 10: MCMC draw of parameters in robust hierarchical Bayesian logit.
axis is the number of samples kept.
Combining these parameters in Tables (3) and (4), we are able to analyze the
marginal effects of these demographic elements. For example, the increase of the long
grace period will decrease the probability of choice. An increase of the high credit
line will attract a selection chance of customers. The whole trend is the same as the
results of the general hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit models.
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Figure 11: MCMC draw of parameters in robust hierarchical Bayesian probit.
From Tables (5 & 6), the result of the robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit
model is better than that of the hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model.
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Table 3: E[Γ] and V ar[E(Γ)] of robust hierarchical Bayesian logit and probit.
E(Γ)
Attribute RHB Probit RHB Logit
β(., .) Intercept Age Income Gender Intercept Age Income Gender
medium fixed interest 0.8951 -0.0053 0.0030 0.0636 1.3511 -0.0066 0.0030 0.0514
low fixed interest 1.8493 -0.0093 0.0062 0.1105 2.7708 -0.0113 0.0064 0.0600
medium variable interest 1.0755 -0.0026 0.0060 -0.0493 1.5507 -0.0035 0.0054 -0.0728
reward program 2 -0.0462 0.0004 -0.0012 -0.0598 -0.0451 -0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0608
reward program 3 -0.2920 0.0043 0.0015 -0.0389 -0.4352 0.0057 0.0012 -0.0155
reward program 4 -0.3596 0.0045 0.0009 0.0007 -0.5321 0.0055 0.0007 0.0306
medium annual fee 0.7924 -0.0050 0.0014 0.1041 1.0891 -0.0050 0.0018 0.0488
low annual fee 1.5525 -0.0073 0.0030 0.2169 2.1432 -0.0077 0.0044 0.1488
bank b -0.0453 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0311 -0.1275 0.0005 -0.0011 0.0146
out-of-state bank -0.82230 -0.0014 0.004 0.0305 -1.4119 0.0001 0.0022 -0.0331
medium rebate 0.5693 -0.0022 0.0015 0.0309 0.7308 -0.0016 0.0006 -0.0127
high rebate 0.9949 -0.0063 0.0081 0.0479 1.2628 -0.0067 0.0076 -0.0092
high credit line 0.3719 -0.0042 -0.0005 0.0932 0.5063 -0.0059 -0.0005 0.1314
long grace period 1.2781 -0.0066 0.0055 0.0740 1.9393 -0.0095 0.0059 0.0625
Var[E(Γ)]
Attribute RHB Probit RHB Logit
β(., .) Intercept Age Income Gender Intercept Age Income Gender
medium fixed interest 8.366e-04 7.737e-06 3.497e-06 5.886e-03 2.629e-03 2.045e-05 8.849e-06 1.888e-02
low fixed interest 2.031e-03 1.088e-05 5.737e-06 1.189e-02 7.566e-03 4.607e-05 2.022e-05 3.238e-02
medium variable interest 1.346e-03 9.347e-06 3.290e-06 7.308e-03 5.749e-03 2.089e-05 1.143e-05 1.706e-02
reward program 2 3.118e-04 2.677e-06 1.093e-06 1.796e-03 5.738e-04 8.574e-06 3.634e-06 3.270e-03
reward program 3 6.045e-04 3.131e-06 1.402e-06 2.769e-03 2.756e-03 9.098e-06 3.565e-06 1.399e-02
reward program 4 1.017e-03 3.539e-06 2.536e-06 5.191e-03 8.123e-03 1.718e-05 1.208e-05 3.952e-02
medium annual fee 6.433e-04 2.279e-06 1.459e-06 3.049e-03 1.960e-03 1.208e-05 8.479e-06 2.061e-02
low annual fee 8.422e-04 6.089e-06 2.182e-06 7.890e-03 5.026e-03 2.923e-05 1.3852e-05 4.301e-02
bank b 9.390e-04 3.053e-06 1.844e-06 4.780e-03 9.469e-04 8.109e-06 4.386e-06 8.804e-03
out-of-state bank 1.986e-03 7.091e-06 4.682e-06 1.203e-02 6.151e-03 3.898e-05 2.134e-05 1.635e-02
medium rebate 4.756e-04 3.695e-06 1.337e-06 2.407e-03 6.611e-03 1.404e-05 4.766e-06 6.568e-03
high rebate 2.509e-03 9.775e-06 3.989e-06 1.104e-02 5.204e-03 2.239e-05 1.069e-05 3.139e-02
high credit line 8.273e-04 3.231e-06 1.039e-06 4.830e-03 1.914e-03 7.903e-06 2.029e-06 1.317e-02
long grace period 1.216e-03 8.428e-06 1.939e-06 7.126e-03 2.867e-03 2.466e-05 9.833e-06 1.834e-02
νofHBlogit = 20, νofHBprobit = 20
Table 4: Comparison E[β] and Var[β] of robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit.
Attribute E[β] Var[β]
β(., .) Rlogit(w) Rprobit(w) Rlogit(w) Rprobit(w)
medium fixed interest 0.010 0.003 0.045 0.036
low fixed interest 0.335 0.532 0.060 0.069
medium variable interest 0.616 0.422 0.195 0.129
reward program 2 -0.506 -0.317 0.083 0.064
reward program 3 0.897 0.634 0.077 0.076
reward program 4 1.307 0.922 0.327 0.232
medium annual fee -0.3445 -0.128 0.246 0.119
low annual fee 1.633 1.061 0.440 0.241
bank b 1.219 0.789 0.251 0.191
out-of-state bank 0.687 0.428 0.324 0.171
medium rebate -0.496 -0.306 0.077 0.065
high rebate 0.826 0.515 0.145 0.095
high credit line 1.620 1.001 0.566 0.315
long grace period -0.235 -0.101 0.249 0.112
Rlogit(w): robust hierarchical bayesian logit model, with ν = 20
Rprobit(w): robust hierarchical bayesian probit model ν = 20
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Table 5: Robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model (500 samples).
Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Logit
ν wLMD wAIC wBIC hLMD hAIC hBIC rLMD rAIC rBIC fe
? -11670.98 11443353 11443825 -5003.416 4843560 4844032 -6841.02 6600017 6600489 -16
7 -10719.91 10534187 10534659 -8126.349 8043093 8043565 -2626.948 2491318 2491790 -2
8 -10805.87 10626944 10627416 -8030.629 7956327 7956799 -2855.613 2670842 2671314 -1
9 -10868.54 10733902 10734374 -7942.388 7894981 7895453 -2980.291 2839145 2839617 -4
10 -11037.44 10855158 10855630 -7931.634 7862585 7863057 -3163.655 2992797 2993269 -3
11 -11156.05 10958913 10959385 -7902.965 7823228 7823700 -3325.279 3135910 3136382 0
12 -11242.28 11065489 11065961 -7873.04 7795967 7796439 -3460.671 3269746 3270218 -3
20 -11958.80 11710985 11711457 -7728.498 7663060 7663532 -4292.588 4048149 4048621 -3
40 -12687.53 12479111 12479583 -7532.458 7450238 7450710 -5259.135 5029097 5029569 -3
Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Probit
ν wLMD wAIC wBIC hLMD hAIC hBIC rLMD rAIC rBIC fe
? -11262.17 10932021 10932493 -4554.749 4381380 4381852 -6803.073 6550865 6551337 -27
7 -10401.11 10234792 10235264 -7822.276 7742459 7742931 -2638.125 2492557 2493029 -5
8 -10508.56 10358401 10358873 -7772.836 7685219 7685691 -2824.978 2673406 2673878 -3
9 -10628.06 10463272 10463745 -7713.193 7622656 7623128 -3021.309 2840840 2841312 -3
10 -10734.51 10568312 10568784 -7648.34 7572063 7572535 -3149.687 2996473 2996945 -2
11 -10818.84 10673712 10674184 -7628.378 7538328 7538800 -3305.076 3135608 3136080 -2
12 -10944.55 10774859 10775331 -7588.046 7508726 7509198 -3408.853 3266357 3266829 -4
20 -11584.86 11384604 11385076 -7430.267 7333211 7333683 -4269.96 4051617 4052089 -5
? represents hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis of robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit model (500
samples).
Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Logit
ν wLMD wAIC wBIC rLMD rAIC rBIC fe
7 0.081 0.079 0.079 0.616 0.623 0.622 0.875
8 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.583 0.595 0.595 0.938
9 0.069 0.062 0.062 0.564 0.570 0.570 0.750
10 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.538 0.547 0.547 0.813
11 0.044 0.042 0.042 0.514 0.525 0.525 1.000
12 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.494 0.505 0.505 0.813
20 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 0.373 0.387 0.387 0.813
40 -0.087 -0.091 -0.091 0.231 0.238 0.238 0.813
Robust Hierarchical Bayesian Probit
ν wLMD wAIC wBIC rLMD rAIC rBIC fe
7 0.076 0.064 0.064 0.612 0.612 0.619 0.815
8 0.067 0.052 0.052 0.585 0.585 0.592 0.889
9 0.056 0.043 0.043 0.556 0.556 0.566 0.889
10 0.047 0.033 0.033 0.537 0.537 0.543 0.926
11 0.039 0.024 0.024 0.514 0.514 0.521 0.926
12 0.028 0.014 0.014 0.499 0.499 0.501 0.852
20 -0.029 -0.041 -0.041 0.372 0.372 0.381 0.815
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3.9 Discussion
There are three type of robustness, namely, robustness to prior distribution, data
range, and model selections. Our robustness means robustness to prior distribution,
and data range. Robustness is not popular because it is difficult to implement at the
beginning of its invention. But it has become popular recently because of many new
computation techniques such as MCMC.
Bayesian statistics is suitable for a hierarchical model and robust estimation be-
cause of its complete condition probability structure. Bayesian regression is better
than the least squares (LS) regression. For example, Bayesian regression is naturally
a ridge regression overcoming the collinearity difficulty of LS.
MCMC has a very easy satisfying convergence condition, namely, irreducible.
The M-H algorithm and Gibbs sampling converge to the stationary distribution of
estimated parameters.
Heterogeneity is a basic objective for Market researcher to understand. The mar-
ket researchers try their best to understand each customer’s choice behavior in order
to forecast market demand.
A heterogenous model matches the fact that each customer is different. It is sup-
posed to have greater prediction precision because of replacing the same parameters
for everyone by specific parameters for each customer.
We also compare the likelihood of the simple logit/probit model with the hier-
archical Bayesian logit/probit model, and robust hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit.
Our robust models have the highest likelihood; the simple logit/probit has the lowest
likelihood.
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A hierarchical model is a method for quantifying market heterogeneity. MCMC is
an ideal computation technique for a Bayesian statistical model. MCMC is a logical,
clear, stable sampling method. The hierarchical logit model seems better than the
hierarchical probit model in this case with these data used. A robust hierarchical
Bayesian logit/probit model should provide a better fit than a hierarchical Bayesian
logit/probit. Our experimental results also demonstrate this advantage.
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CHAPTER IV
DYNAMIC PRICING WITH STOCHASTIC DEMAND
AND JUMP EVENTS IN PRODUCTION-INVENTORY
SYSTEMS
This chapter focuses on the application of brand choice models in dynamic pricing
problems. Since McFadden’s winning of the Nobel prize in 2000, the logit/probit has
found a new application in the dynamic pricing problem.
The objective of dynamic pricing is to maximize revenue by balancing production
and inventory, and satisfying customers’ demands. Pricing is subject to customers’
acceptance. Logit/probit is a well-known brand choice model whose output is the
probability of each arriving customer’s choosing our products.
In previous literature, most demand processes are assumed to be nonhomogeneous
Poisson processes. We assume the rate parameter λ in the nonhomogeneous Poisson
process is a stochastic diffusion process. The demand rate process is positive, mean
reversion, and has a stable distribution. The Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) process, a
short interest rate process, matches our assumptions.
Production systems often need maintenance and occasional repair. There are
many elements affecting production rate. These discrete events are jumps modeled
by a mark-time Poisson process.
92
The final proposed model is a stochastic dynamic programming model. Some con-
cave and monotone structural properties are discussed. Computation is also one of
our concerns because of the difficulty of solving the Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman equation
in a closed form. The Markov chain approximation method is applied because of its
nice convergence property.
Finally, we present some numeric examples in different situations where there are
no jumps, jumps with different jump-amplitude distributions, perishable inventory,
and logit/probit as customers’ response.
We study the following dynamic pricing model. There is a production-inventory
system where there are jump events , and customer choices must be considered. Our
work considers (1) a complex demand rate λ model, (2) a dynamic pricing model
integrating production, inventory, and market information together in the stochastic
dynamic programming framework, (3) discussion of structural properties of this type
of problem, and (4) numerical examples.
4.1 Introduction
Revenue management began with the reformation of the U.S. airline industry in the
late 1970s. Dynamic pricing is a revenue management practice that has spread beyond
airlines to the health care, rental car, cruise line, railway, energy, and broadcasting
industries.
In recent years, dynamic pricing has attracted the attention of both researchers
and entrepreneurs. In particular, there are increased applications in retail industries.
Determining the maximum price versus changing demand flow is a two-edged sword.
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It can increase revenue, but also rejects the customers. The price is influenced by
market information from competitors and present customer loyalty.
A substantial amount of management literature on revenue management (yield
management) has been published over the last 20 years. The earliest works on ca-
pacity control are Littlewood (1972), Brumelle and McGill (1993), and Curry (1990).
Lee and Hersh (1993) introduced and analyzed a discrete-time Markov model that
allows for an arbitrary order of arrivals.
In the early stages of dynamic pricing of applications, the goal is to balance supply
and demand. This is mainly applied in industries with a constant short-term capacity
(supply), such as airlines, cruise ships, hotels, electric utilities, sporting events, and
health care (Gallego and van Ryzin (1994, 1997), McGill and van Ryzin (1999), and
Weatherford and Bodily (1992)).
In manufacturing systems, Whitin (1955) may have been the first to suggest the
need to consider pricing and inventory control strategies together in a non-perishable
environment such as retailing. In his paper, Whitin examined a single period problem,
very similar to a newsboy problem, and determined a single price and supply quan-
tity. Numerous other researchers have considered price determination and restocking
in a multi-period setting. Swann (2001) also considered a dynamic pricing model
connected with production-inventory systems whose models are in the deterministic
optimization framework.
More recent applications have focused on retail industries, where the short-term
supply varies and replenishes, and the object is to optimize inventory management.
Advances in the Internet and e-commerce have provided a feasible and reliable method
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for just-in-time inventory management. A recent survey of revenue management re-
search is provided by McGill and van Ryzin (1999). Barnhart and Talluri (1996)
provided an overview of yield management and other airline operations research ar-
eas.
The nonhomogeneous compound Poisson process and dynamic programming have
important applications in the dynamic pricing problem. Gallego et al. (1997) em-
ployed intensity control and obtained structural monotonic results for the optimal
intensity (respect to price) as a function of the stock level and the length of the hori-
zon. Bitran et al. (1998) considered a retail chain application. Zhao et al. (2000)
considered the given stock of a perishable product over a finite horizon. They also
discussed some of the structural properties of this type of dynamic pricing problem.
4.2 Production-Inventory Systems and Brand Choice
4.2.1 Dynamic Pricing in Production-Inventory Systems
The description of a discrete model follows the description by Swann (2001). The
mathematical formulation of this pricing problem considers a facility that must deter-
mine prices for a single product over a finite horizon. For each period k ∈ {1, ..., T},
let Xk, Dk, and Ik be the amount of product produced, the demand satisfied, and
inventory at the end of the period k, respectively. This model follows the classic
production inventory model.
The system may produce a maximum of Qk products in the time period k, Rk(Dk)
is the revenue function of Dk, and the production cost incurred in period k is ck per
unit produced. Production costs are initially assumed to be linear. Inventory holding
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cost at a rate of hk dollars per unit is charged for any inventory carried from period
k − 1 to k. The optimization problem to find the maximum net revenue (profit) and
best price, q∗, for each time k ∈ {1, T} with respect to the output vector X = {Xk}






Rk(Dk)− hkIk − ckXk
)
s.t. Ik+1 = Ik + Xk −Dk
Xk ≤ Qk
I1 = 0, Ik, Xk, Dk ∈ R+. k = 1, 2, ...., T
(4.2.1)
The object is to find the best price at time k ∈ [0, T ] that makes the maximum
revenue during time [0,T]. In our examples, we consider the perishable inventory case.
4.2.2 Combination Logit or Probit with Dynamic Pricing Models
Logit and probit are models for a customer’s brand choice. McFadden (1974) com-
pleted the analysis: the logit model for the choice probabilities implies that unob-
served utility is an extreme value random variable. In his Nobel lecture, McFadden
(2001) provided a fascinating history of the development of the model.
Logit and probit models are used to calculate the probability of choice, so the
Dk = logit(qkβ)∗λk = exp qkβ1+exp qkβ ∗λk or Dk = probit(qkβ)∗λk = Φ(qkβ)∗λk, where λtk
is the demand rate for the product and Φ is the std normal cdf. Set Rk(Dk) = qk ∗Dk
























1 + exp qkβ















qkΦ(qkβ)λk − hkIk − ckXk
)
This is a nonlinear programming model.
Let the inventory at time k be :
Ik = max[Xk − logit(qkβ)λk, 0] or Ik = max[Xk − probit(qkβ)λk, 0]
4.3 Stochastic Diffusion Equation of λ of the Demand Pois-
son Process
Let us begin with some assumptions:
1. Negative demand rates are not allowed.
2. There is a steady distribution for the demand rate.
3. Demand rate has the mean-reverse feature.
We borrow short interest rate models for the dynamic of λ(t). There are several short
rate models: Rendleman and Bartter model, Vasicek model, and CIR model. We
use CIR because it matches our assumptions. Figure (12) shows sample paths of a
demand rate dλ(t) = (1/6− λ(t))dt + 0.5
√
λ(t)dW (t). λ(t) is the demand rate.
Now, we present the continuous-time model. The following are some parameter
definitions used in the continuous-time situation. X(t): the production rate. λ(t): the
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Figure 12: Sample path of CIR process, λ(0) = 0
demand rate in the market. c(t): the production cost. q(t): the dynamic price. h(t):
the inventory cost per time unit. I(t): the inventory rate. In the continuous-time
case, we assume the product rate is considered as the decision variable. The models
are translated into the following optimal, expected profit model if we use logit as the
customer’s response function:






q(t) min[λ(t)H̄(q(t))φ,X(t)]− h(t)I(t)− c(t)X(t)
}
dt
dX(t) = f(X(t), λ(t), q(t))dt
dλ(t) = α (θ − λ(t)) dt + σ
√
λ(t)dW (t)
I(t) = max[X(t)− λ(t)H̄(q(t))φ, 0]
H̄(q(t)) = logit(q(t)β) or H̄(q(t)) = probit(q(t)β)
I(t), X(t), λ(t) ∈ R+.
(4.3.1)
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φ is the demands at each arrival, α and θ are constants, and σ is the volatility.




































































































































































Lemma 4.3.2 If the φ is a normal random variable with Norm(u, σ2), a ≤ φ ≤ b,
a > 0, b > 0, Φ is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the norm distribution,
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4.4 Structural Properties in no-Jump situation
Compound Poisson model: at time zero, the company has stock n to sell, and s > 0
and the controlled Poisson demand density is λ̂(s) = λ(q(s)) = λ(s) ∗ H̄(q(s))φ. At
time s using the pricing policy as optimal price q(s), and the average demand of each
arrival is φe. λ(s) is the original demand rate of the Poisson process. The whole
103
problem can be modeled as














By condition on the arrival of demands, we have









+ V ∗(I −Xdt− φ,X, λ, t)
)

















+ V ∗(I − φ,X, λ, t)
)





















V ∗(I, X, λ, t)− V ∗(I − φ, X, λ, t)
)}
We set g(t) = E
[
q(t) min[λ̂(s), X(s)]− c(t)X(t)− h(t) max[X(t)− λ̂(t), 0]
]
> 0.
We have the following structural properties when there is no inventory cost and
no production, but there is initial stock.
Lemma 4.4.1 When there is no inventory cost and no production, but there is initial
stock, V ∗(X, I, λ, t) and q(t) have the following properties:
1. V ∗(X, I, λ, t) increases in both I and t. See Zhao et al. (2000).
2. V ∗(X, I, λ, t) is concave in I and t when demand is homogenous where there are
no inventory cost. See Gallego et al. (1994). Zhao et al. (2000) extended this
to the non-homogenous case. V ∗(X, I, λ, t) is concave in I at fixed t.
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3. ∆V ∗(X, I, λ, t) increases in t.
Proof.









V ∗(I, X, λ, t)− V ∗(I − φ,X, λ, t)
)]}
= λ(t)b(q∗, I, X, λ, t)




V ∗(I, X, λ, t)− V ∗(I − φ, X, λ, t)
)]
∂∆V ∗(I, X, λ, t)
∂t
= λ(t)b(q∗, I, X, λ, t)− b(q′ , I −∆I,X, λ, t)
= λ(t)
(
b(q∗, I, X, λ, t)− b(q′ , I, X, λ, t)
+ b(q
′













V ∗(I,X, λ, t)− V ∗(I − φ,X, λ, t)
)
− g(t) + E
(











−∆V ∗(I,X, λ, t) + ∆V ∗(I −∆I, X, λ, t)
)}
≥ 0
b(q∗, I, X, λ, t)− b(q′ , I, X, λ, t) ≥ 0, q∗ is the optimal solution,
∆V ∗(I−∆I, X, λ, t)−∆(V ∗(I, X, λ, t) ≥ 0, V ∗ is the concave function of I,∆I > 0 .
I,X,λ,q V ∗ are short for I(t), X(t), λ(t), q(t), V ∗(I, X, λ, t). 
4. q(t) decreases in I for any given t.
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Proof.
0 > b(q∗, I, X, λ, t)− b(q′ , I, X, λ, t)
= g(q∗, t)− g(q′ , t) + ∆V ∗(I, X, λ, t)
≥ g(q∗, t)− g(q′ , t) + ∆V ∗(I + ∆I, X, λ, t)
= b(q∗, I + ∆I, X, λ, t)− b(q′ , I + ∆I, X, λ, t)

4.5 Dynamic Pricing using Stochastic Dynamic Program-
ming Theory
In this section, we present the stochastic dynamic programming framework to solve
the dynamic pricing problem.
4.5.1 Models and Algorithm
This research focuses on the continuous-time dynamic pricing model with the stochas-
tic dynamic programming framework. The demand process is modeled by a stochastic
diffusion process (CIR). Thus, the system with logit model will become






q(t) min[λ(t)H̄(q(t))φ, X(t)]− h(t)I(t)− c(t)X(t)
}
dt
dX(t) = f(X(t), λ(t), t)dt
dλ(t) = α (θ − λ(t)) dt + σ
√
λ(t)dW (t)
I(t) = max[(X(t)− λ(t)H̄(q(t))φ), 0]
H̄(q(t)) = logit(q(t)β)) or H̄(q(t)) = probit(q(t)β))
I0 = 0, X(t) ≤ Q(t), I(t), X(t), λ(t) ∈ R+
(4.5.1)
V ∗(X, λ) means the expected maximum average profit from 0 to T , and the expected
maximum average profit is the function of X, λ.
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And further, equation (4.5.2) is a forward equation. The HJB equation for this system
in discrete time by forward Euler approximation























When applying finite difference, we get the approximated Markov chain:
V ∗k+1(λ, X) = max
qk
{
pk{(λ, X), (λ, X)}V ∗k (λ, X)
+ pk{(λ, X), (λ± hλ, X)}V ∗k (λ± hλ, X)
+ pk{(λ, X), (λ, X ± hX)}V ∗k (λ, X ± hX) +4tkgk(λ, X, q)
}
































gk(λ, X, q) = E
[
min[λkH̄(qk)φqk, Xk]− hk max[Xk − λkH̄(qk)φqk, 0]
]
− ckXk
b1k = α(θ − λk)
b+1k = max[b1k, 0], b
−
1k = −min[b1k, 0]
b2k = fk, b
+
2k = max[b2k, 0], b
−
2k = −min[b2k, 0]
pk{(λ, X), (λ, X)}: transient probability at time k from (λ, X) to (λ, X). pk{(λ, X), (λ±
hλ, X)}: transient probability at time k from (λ, X) to (λ ± hλ, X). hλ and hX are
step coefficients of λ and X respectively.
4.5.2 Numerical Examples without Jump Events
We show two numerical examples. Their profits, price, inventory, and production
rate are displayed. These examples represent the production process is in the normal
state without jump events.
Example one: the logit model is used as the customer’s response function. No
mark-time Poisson process exists in this example. The total profit, optimal dynamic
prices, inventory, and production rate are displayed in Figures (13) and (14). The
model is








1 + exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)
, X(t)]
− 0.5X(t)− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φ exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)




dλ(t) = 10 (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
X(t) = 20 + sin(2t),
φ = unif [1, 40], λ(t) ∈ [2.7, 3.2], X(t) ∈ [19, 21], t ∈ [0, 1], T = 1.
.
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In Figure (13), we can see the profit increases in t and λ. The price increases in
λ. In Figure (14), the average inventory decreases in λ.
Figure 13: Profit and price in perishable case: no jump, logit.
Figure 14: Inventory and production in perishable case: no jump, logit.
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Example two: the probit model is used as the customer response function, and
without a mark-time Poisson process in the production rate equation. The model is






q(t) min[λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), X(t)]− 0.5X(t)
− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), 0]
}
dt
dλ(t) = 10 (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
X(t) = 20 + sin(2t)
φ = uinf [1, 40], λ(t) ∈ [2.7, 3.2], X(t) ∈ [19, 21], t ∈ [0, 1], T = 1.
The total profit, optimal dynamic prices, inventory, and production rate are displayed
in Figures (15) and (16). we can see the profit increases in t and λ. The price increases
in λ. The average inventory decreases in λ.
Figure 15: Profit and price in perishable case: no jump, probit.
From the two examples, we can see that the price is increased later in the second
example compared with the first example. This relates to the difference between the
logit and probit model.
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Figure 16: Inventory and production in perishable case: no jump, probit.
4.6 Dynamic Pricing with Jump Events in Production-Inventory
Systems
Jump events in production-inventory systems are due to some events such as addi-
tional capacity availability, new high technique or additional availability of funds, or
external input of this product. Conversely, jump events could include the unavailabil-
ity of a critical piece of production machinery. D(t) is the demand rate, I(t) is the
inventory rate, X(t) is the production rate, h(t) is the inventory cost in unit time,
and c(t) is the production cost in unit time. Below are some definitions about jumps:
1. The arrival at time τ1 < τ2 < · · ·, where τi is the time of the ith arrival of jump.
The arrival rate is λJ(t).
2. The jump amplitude is a random variable drawn from Q at the time τ ; then
the time of arrival τ and the jump amplitude z ∈ Q from a mark-time Poisson
process. The measure of this mark-time Poisson process is
E[P(dz, dt)] = η(z)dzλJ(t)dt
η(z) is the pdf of z, λJ(t) is the rate of the mark-time Poisson process.
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Figure 17: Production rate sample path.
Figure (17) shows a sample path of production rate:
dX(t) = cos(2t)dt− dP (t)
with jump events whose λJ=3.0, the amplitude is a uniform random variable [-0.2,
0.2].
The model at this situation is






q(t) min[λ(t)φH̄(q(t)), X(t)]− h(t)I(t)− c(t)X(t)
}
dt
dX(t) = f(X(t), λ(t), q(t))dt + dP (t)
dλ(t) = α (θ − λ(t)) dt + σ
√
λ(t)dW (t)
I0 = 0, X(t) ≤ Q(t), I(t), X(t), λ(t) ∈ R+
I(t) = max[X(t)− λ(t)φH̄(q(t)), 0]
(4.6.1)
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where λJ is the rate of jumps, and η is the probability density of the jump amplitude.
After constructing the approximated Markov chain from the HJB equation, we
get
V ∗k+1(X, λ) = max
qk
{
pk{(λ, X), (λ, X)}V ∗k (X, λ) + pk{(λ, X)(λ± hλ, X)}V ∗k (λ± hλ, X)





(V ∗k (X + z)− V ∗k (X))η(z)dz
(4.6.3)
where










pk{(λ, X), (λ, X ± hX)} = ∆tk
b±1k
hX
















gk(λ, X, q) = E
[
min[λkqkφH̄(qk), Xk]− hk max[Xk − λkqkφH̄(qk), 0]
]
− ckXk
b1k = fk, b
+
1k = max[b1k, 0], b
−
1k = −min[b1k, 0]
b2k = α(θ − λk) b+2k = max[b2k, 0], b
−
2k = −min[b2k, 0]
(4.6.4)
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where z is the jump amplitude value, and hλ and hX are step coefficients of λ and
X, respectively. Q is the jump amplitude domain.
4.6.1 Structural Properties in Jump Situation
We have the following structural properties, which are different from the properties
without jumps.
Lemma 4.6.1 1. V ∗(X, I, λ, t) may not increase in t.
2. V ∗(X, I, λ, t) may not be concave in t.
3. ∆V ∗(X, I, λ, t) may not increase in t.
Proof.
From equation (4.6.3), we have
V ∗k+1(X, λ) = max
qk
{
V ∗k (X, λ)− (1− pk{(λ, X), (λ, X)})V ∗k (X, λ)
+ pk{(λ, X)(λ± hλ, X)}V ∗k (λ± hλ, X)











k (X + z)η(z)dz − V ∗k (X) < 0, and
− (1− pk{(λ, X), (λ, X)})V ∗k (X, λ) + pk{(λ, X)(λ± hλ, X)}V ∗k (λ± hλ, X)
+ pk{(λ, X), (λ, X ± hX)}V ∗k (λ, X ± hλ) +4tk−1gk(λ, X, q)) + λJ4tJk < 0
(4.6.6)
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then V ∗k+1(X, λ) < V
∗
k (X, λ). So the V
∗(X,λ) is no increase by t, the ∆V ∗(X, I, λ, t)
may not be increasing in t, and V ∗(X, λ) may not be the concave function of t.

4.6.2 Numerical Examples with Jump Events
There are four examples in this section. Two examples are about uniform distributed
jump amplitude. The other two are about normally distributed jump amplitude.
Example three: the jump amplitude is a uniform random variable, and the logit
model is used as the customer response function. Figure (18) shows the profit and
price. The model is








1 + exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)
, X(t)]
− 0.5X(t)− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φ exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)




dλ(t) = 10 (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
dX(t) = 2cos(2t) + dP (t)
dP is a mark-time Poisson process whose amplitude is a unif [−0.5,−0.05]. The
jump rate λJ = 1 + sin(t ∗ 10), t is the time, X(0) = 20, φ = unif [1, 40], λ(t) ∈
[2.7, 3.2], t ∈ [0, 1], and T = 1. In Figure (18), we can see that the profit does not
strictly increases in t, but it still increases in λ. The price increases in λ, but the
price is changed only one time compared with the no-jump situation, two times.
Example four: the jump amplitude is a truncated normal random variable. The
solution is shown in Figure (19). The model is








1 + exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)
, X(t)]
− 0.5X(t)− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φ exp(−0.2q(t) + 5)




dλ(t) = 10 ∗ (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
dX(t) = 2cos(2t)dt + dP (t)
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Figure 18: Perishable case: jump amplitude is a unif[-0.5,-0.05], logit.
dP is a mark-time Poisson process whose amplitude is a truncated normal random
variable ([−0.5,−0.05]Norm(0.2, 1/400)). The jump rate λJ = 1 + sin(t ∗ 5), t is the
time, X(0) = 20, φ = unif [1, 40], λ(t) ∈ [2.7, 3.2], t ∈ [0, 1], and T = 1. In Figure
(19), we can see that the profit still strictly increases in t and in λ. The price increases
in λ, but the price is also less changed compared with the no-jump situation.
Figure 19: Perishable case: normally distributed jump amplitude, logit.
The following examples are of the probit model used as the customers’ response
function.
Example five: the jump amplitude is a uniform random variable. Figure (20) is
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the numerical result.






q(t) min[λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), X(t)]− 0.5X(t)
− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), 0]
}
dt
dλ(t) = 10 (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
dX(t) = 2cos(2t)dt + dP (t)
dP is a mark-time Poisson process whose amplitude is a unif [−0.5,−0.05]. The
jump rate λJ = 1 + sin(t ∗ 10), t is the time, X(0) = 20, φ = unif [1, 40], λ(t) ∈
[2.7, 3.2], t ∈ [0, 1], and T = 1.
Figure 20: Perishable case: jump amplitude is a unif[-0.5,-0.05], probit.
Example six (Figure 21): the jump amplitude is a truncated normal random
variable.






q(t) min[λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), X(t)]
− 0.5X(t)− 0.2 max[X(t)− λ(t)φΦ(−0.2q(t) + 5), 0]
}
dt
dλ(t) = 10 (2− λ(t)) dt + 0.3
√
λ(t)dW (t)
dX(t) = 2cos(2t)dt + dP (t)
dP is a mark-time Poisson process whose amplitude is a truncated normal random
variable ([−0.5,−0.05]Norm(0.2, 1/400)). The jump rate λJ = 1 + sin(t ∗ 5), t is the
117
time, X0 = 20, φ = unif [1, 40], λ(t) ∈ [2.7, 3.2], t ∈ [0, 1], and T = 1. In Figure (21),
we can see that the price increases earlier compared with the result of using logit as
the customers’ response function.
Figure 21: Perishable case: normally distributed jump amplitude, probit.
4.7 Discussion
The objective of dynamic pricing is to increase the profit. But it is also subject to cus-
tomers’ will to buy your products or brands when the price is increased. Sometimes
we need to decrease price to clear inventory by attracting customers. The Internet
technique makes e-commerce possible and grow fast. Especially dynamic pricing is a
characteristic of revenue management based on e-commerce. If e-commerce compa-
nies do not utilize the dynamic pricing strategy, they actually waste Internet resources.
The previous dynamic price models seem too simple to use in real situations. For
example, inventory costs must be considered. Gallego and Zhao got some structural
properties with many assumptions such as no inventory cost and no production. Most
of these properties may not hold in a practical situation.
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In previous papers, demands are modeled by a simple parameter λ. Actually, λ
has its own dynamics, for example, mean-reversion properties. Most supply-demand
relations drive the mean-reversion demand of most of products/brands. CIR has a
closed-form analysis solution, which is very good for analyzing the demand process.
The ideal situation of a production situation is supposed to be stable. However,
there are always some random disturbances, or planned events occur such as main-
tenance and repair. The mark-time process is a suitable stochastic process for those
expected/unexpected events. Actually, Brownian motion is unsuitable for modelling
the production process because the diffusion process continuously changes, namely,
the frequency of variation of the production process is too high. We do not want the
capacity of a production line to change every minute.
Logit and probit have similar predictive precision. The outputs of logit/probit,
namely, the customer’s choice probability, are close. The function of the logit/probit
model represents the customer’s response/ feedback to our dynamic price. The feed-
back structure makes the whole systems stable such that we cannot increase prices
at will.
Our model, including the demands model, production model, inventory, and cus-
tomer’s choice, is more practical compared with any previous models. Our model
may be able to explore all kinds of situations in real life.
The dynamic price stays the same in most cases, which matches the real situation
in a stable market. That means price should not be changed too often; that may not
be a good policy.
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Homogenous and nonhomogeneous Poisson processes are the theoretical tools to
analyze demand processes on which dynamic pricing is based. Dynamic pricing based
on a mark-time Poisson process is essentially a stochastic dynamic programming
problem , and the dynamic price can be calculated by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation. An extended model, which includes the production-inventory information
and jump event in this system, is also considered. These numerical results show an
insignificant difference in the whole trend of total profit and optimal price between
using probit and logit as the customer response function.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we developed a new game model, namely, a stochastic differential-
jump game model, and applied it to the brand’s market competition in a specific
situation. Our robust Bayesian hierarchical logit/probit model has more precise esti-
mation and predictive ability. For example, the prediction precision is increased 80%
on average compared with the results of a general hierarchical Bayesian logit/probit
model in our experiments. Our continuous-time dynamic pricing model is suitable
in different situations: jump, or no-jump cases. There are many important oppor-
tunities for future research along the direction of our work. We elaborate on these
possibilities in the following paragraphs.
(a) The curse of dimensionality of dynamic programming (DP) is also an issue
of difficulty when solving the stochastic differential-jump game model developed in
this thesis. New computational methods for N-player game model have to be found.
Approximate dynamic programming (Powell 2007) is proposed to solve the compu-
tational complexity of DP. We also could use an approximate dynamic programming
to solve the stochastic differential-jump game model.
(b) We can also apply fuzzy logic and set theory in the market competition model.
Fuzzy game (Garagic et al. 2003) can incorporate the players’ heuristic knowledge
into conventional game theory. Could fuzzy logic be combined with the stochastic
differential jump-game framework? If yes, then one must explore strategies for solving
the game model.
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(c) As with the hierarchical logit/probit model, we can develop a fuzzy regression
model (Babuska 1998) in the bottom level. These models may lead to a fuzzy hierar-
chical logit/probit model. Because logit and probit transform a continuous variable
to a discrete variable, their function is similar to the fuzzy characteristic function.
Could we develop the robust regression through fuzzy logic?
(d) The variance reduction techniques such as antithetic, control variate, and
quasi-Monte Carlo simulation could be employed in a hierarchical model. The hierar-
chical structure could be complex, and feasible for variance propagation. Antithetic
technique is very easy to implement. We sample random elements in opposite direc-
tions, and take the average as the mean. Quasi-Monte Carlo simulation is used to find
the low difference random number generator. Control variate is to add a correlated
random variable to make the estimated variance reduced.
(e) We also could consider a dynamic price model in a nonperishable inventory
case where inventory could be accumulated. The inventory cost is increased, and we
also may need to set the inventory as an independent state variable to be tracked.
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